THEOLOGY

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EDITORIAL

The need has long been felt of a standard work giving a thorough and comprehensive account of the constitutional position of the Anglican Communion overseas; and the massive work* which Dr. Lowther Clarke, formerly Archbishop of Melbourne, has now completed will take rank at once as the book of reference required. It is a happy coincidence that such a book should appear in the year of the Wembley Exhibition; and the hope is not perhaps vain that its pages may fire many of our younger men with a sense of the large heritage of work and opportunity in God's service which belongs to English Church-people. The tables showing the growth of the Overseas Episcopate give us a bird's-eye view of a history of ordered and continuous Church expansion worthy to be set beside that which marked the early centuries of Christendom; while the successive chapters, with their historical introductions, extracts from letters, legal opinions, and minutes, and the full texts of the constitutions now prevailing, enable the student to grasp the complex issues which each member of the great organism has had to meet in its development. Now and then we have a glimpse of the patient and unwearied care with which the Mother-See of Canterbury watches over the growth of her children, helping, guiding, strengthening them. And behind and over all works the over-ruling Providence of God.

* *Constitutional Church Government in the Dominions beyond the Seas and in other Parts of the Anglican Communion.* (S.P.C.K. 25s. net.)

THE GOSPEL OF LIFE: A STUDY IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL

[NOTE.—It has been suggested that chapter v. originally came between chapters vi. and vii. I admit that this view makes the interpretation of vii. 1 more obvious, and that the reference back to the healing on the Sabbath (vii. 21) is in its favour. On the other hand, if our Lord was to challenge the Jews on the principle of healing on the Sabbath, the challenge would probably have been delivered in the earlier rather than in the later year. And chapter vi. implies a more advanced state of antagonism between our Lord and the Jews than chapter v. In any case, for the purpose of the present inquiry, we are taking the story as it stands.]

IV.—MY FATHER AND I

IN our Lord's own mind Jerusalem had already virtually rejected Him. It remained to give her the opportunity of acting out her rejection of Him, by setting forth in Jerusalem the Gospel which she was to reject.

The influence of Jerusalem had already no doubt made itself felt in Galilee. The earliest occasion for the manifestation of definite antagonism was the claim to forgive sins at the healing of the paralytic. On this occasion St. Luke notes the presence of Pharisees and doctors of the Law from Jerusalem. The antagonism thus provoked found the readiest cause of attack in His overt disregard of the conventional rules as to the Sabbath. The healing of the man with the withered hand, in particular, had been followed by a council with the Herodians on the part of the Pharisees, who would probably, in taking such action, have been in touch, or at least in sympathy, with Jerusalem. And the limitation imposed upon His mission, to manifest the mercy and the healing love of God to those that needed it, would very naturally move Him to choose this as the ground of His challenge to the representatives of Judaism at Jerusalem. During the year which passed between the Passovers of chapter ii. and chapter vi. falls the whole story of the ministry in Galilee up to the Feeding of the Five Thousand. This period, the main period of manifestation in Galilee, has to answer to it in the Fourth Gospel only this one story of chapter v. There is nothing to fix the point in the story of the Galilean ministry at which we are to understand that this visit to Jerusalem took place. The occasion is described only as a Feast of the Jews. This description makes it very unlikely that it was any of the more important and familiar festivals. And Dr. Westcott's suggestion that it was the Feast of Trumpets, which was pre-eminently a great Sabbath, harmonizes with the idea which the story itself suggests, that our Lord was presenting

a deliberate challenge to Jerusalem on the conflict between Sabbath observance and the primary law of mercy.

The challenge was delivered by the healing of the impotent man at the pool of Bethesda. And the inevitable consequence followed. "For this cause the Jews persecuted Jesus, because He did"—*i.e.*, either on this occasion, or was in the habit of doing—"these things on the Sabbath day." Our Lord defended His action in the words, "My Father worketh even until now, and I work." The words, in their primary reference, contain a justification of healing on the Sabbath by reference to the Fourth Commandment, which laid down the law of the Sabbath. The Sabbath rest enjoined by the commandment reproduces the Sabbath rest of God after Creation. But the Sabbath rest of God is not inactivity. Like all real rest in the natural order, it is the substitution of one energy for another. And, to consummate the work of creation, God had been at work, all through history as known to the Jew, in law and prophecy and vision, on the work of redemption.

This was a direct and relevant answer to the condemnation of the Jews. It was not an appeal to religious practice as based on the law, like the defence in vii. 23; nor yet an appeal to the natural instinct of humanity, like the defence of His action in the Synoptic stories. It was an appeal to the substance of the law of the Sabbath itself. It was, therefore, especially appropriate to the audience to whom it was addressed. Of this defence of healing on the Sabbath on its merits the Jews took no notice.

From this point the question of healing on the Sabbath disappears from discussion, though it reappears later in vii. 21-24.

But our Lord's answer, while meeting their objection directly and on its own ground, did more than this. It contained, and, as a defence of His action, it was essential that it should contain, a claim to manifest and interpret the mind of God by the work of healing. The work should have appealed to them in itself as a work of God, simply as a healing, as a work of mercy. If they had had the mind of God it would have so appealed to them, and the way would have been opened to their recognition of his relation to the Father. But they had not the mind of God, and the work of healing did not appeal to them as a work of God. The claim, therefore, of His unique relation to the Father was left as a bare authoritative claim. He was "calling God His own Father, making Himself equal with God." The claim was summed up in the words which we may isolate from the rest of His brief utterance—"My Father and I."

It is with the defence and interpretation of the truth which is embodied in these words that we are concerned in the discourse which follows.

To the Jew the words sounded as an abrupt and imperious claim. They were, in fact, a revelation of the essential law of life, communion with the Father. Isolated from any apprehension of the life-giving act of healing proceeding from the source of life itself, they embodied what seemed an impossible and presumptuous claim.

This sense of presumption in His claim our Lord meets, but in meeting it He in no way withdraws from the claim; rather He amplifies it, and gives it a wider spiritual range.

To meet the sense in His hearers of an abrupt and imperious claim, He dwells upon the essential humility involved in the claim, a humility correlative with the enhanced assertion which follows of the share of the Son in the whole activity of the Father. "The Son can do nothing of Himself, except He see the Father doing it."

This humility is the humility of love, the response in the Son to the love of the Father, who showeth Him all things that Himself doeth.

There is no limit to the power thus given to the Son. The Father's power to give life is shared by the Son. "As the Father hath life in Himself, so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself." As the Father raiseth up the dead, so the Son quickeneth whom He will.

And this communication to the Son of the original life-giving power carries with it the prerogative of judgment as to those to whom He will give life. And this prerogative gives Him the right to honour such as is given to the Father. To deny this honour to the Son is to deny it to the Father who gives it.

The claim is thus maintained at its full height. But the essential humility of the claim is enunciated afresh, "I can of Myself do nothing." And the fresh assertion of the humility of the claim is associated with a disclaimer of personal aim, through which we pass to another mark of the essential character of the Son, differentiating it from the character of those who are opposing Him. His judgment on those to whom He cannot give life is just, since it has a standard of judgment other than His own. He seeks not His own will, but the will of His Father that sent Him. And, as He is not guided by a judgment that is His own, so He is not dependent on His own witness to Himself. He has, beyond the witness of John, the witness of the Father in the works which the Father has given Him to do—the Father, whose mind they show that they do

not know by not believing in Him whom He has sent, although the Scripture to which they look bears witness of Him; and yet they reject the offer of life.

He is not dependent on the recognition of men. But they reject Him because He comes in His Father's name. If any came in His own name Him they would receive. They are dependent on the recognition of men; they receive honour one of another, as though man could claim or bestow honour of himself. The only honour comes from dependence on God. The law in which they trust is their accuser, for the law wrote of Him whom they reject.

The claim, then, "My Father and I," has been shown to be the claim of humility in the Son who can do nothing of Himself. It has been shown to be the revelation of the Divine love, the love between the Father and the Son, which made it natural for the Father to commit all things to the Son, and for the Son to depend in all things on the Father. This was the revelation of the law of the new life as manifested in its source. Why was the Jew blind to the revelation? There was wanting in him that which in us answers to the dependence of the Son on the Father, the dependence of man on God, the dependence of faith. Faith in us answers to and reproduces the dependence of Sonship.* How can ye believe which receive glory one of another? Ye have not the love of God in yourselves. They were condemned, as we have said, not for not believing in Christ, but for not having in them the temper, the character, which made belief in Christ possible. Like believes in like. Only the temper of faith, the temper of dependence on God, as revealed to them hitherto, could receive the revelation of sonship, the revelation of the Father's love working the work of redemption in the Son, the revelation of the Son living, speaking, acting, in the perpetual dependence of love on the Father. "My Father and I."

Plainly, in the mind of the Evangelist, the healing of the impotent man is an instance, an application of the life-giving power, whose further manifestation will be seen in raising the dead to life. Our Lord claims that the source of this life-giving power is in the life of the Son in His dependence on the Father, and in the love of the Father which gives it, and He teaches that, accordingly, it cannot be apprehended or understood except by those who are living in a similar dependence on the Father, and so are in sympathy with the character of this life at its source. The law of spiritual life is the mutual trust and dependence of love. "This is life eternal, that they should know Thee." So our Lord says in the great prayer before the

* *Cf.* H. S. Holland, *Fourth Gospel*, p. 155.

Passion. And it is this "knowledge," the "knowledge" of the Jew, no barren intellectual acknowledgment, but the living give-and-take between spirit and spirit, it is this knowledge which is here described to us, the life of the Son, the perpetual spring of life and light which issues from the communion of the Father and the Son, the life which the Father has in Himself, and which He gives to the Son to have in Himself, for it belongs to the very being of God.

What it is—this life, what is its ground, its character, its issue, we shall see when we come to the time when He says "I know Mine own and Mine own know Me, even as the Father knoweth Me and I know the Father."

WILFRID RICHMOND.

AUTOSUGGESTION

AUTOSUGGESTION, Psychoanalysis, and Psychotherapy are three words familiar to everyone, even if he reads nothing but novels and newspapers. Whether the ideas conveyed to the minds of people who do not make the subjects indicated by these words a matter of special study are always clear and the same for one person as for another may be open to question; but that these subjects have a common ground, will be clear to anyone who has paid any attention to them. This common ground is the Subconscious, or, as some prefer to call it, the Unconscious Mind. It is the writer's intention in this short article merely to state his own attitude towards these subjects as a student of Natural Science and as a member of the Church of England, and as one who has considered the subjects indicated from those points of view, and not as a psychologist or as a specialist in any one of the subjects. In doing this he may display much ignorance to experts on these subjects, but he will try to state fairly the good he sees in them, and just as fairly what appear to him as defects in, or exaggerated claims made for, them. If by doing this he shall incite someone with greater knowledge to write on the same subject, one main object of the article will be attained.

First it may be asked what reasons can be given for studying these subjects at all. Reasons, and good reasons, may easily be given. A knowledge of these may be of some use to the Church, and it is certain that there are many who would put the matter more strongly than this. Again, anyone who will look over the annual return of the causes of death in this country will find another urgent reason why these subjects are deserving

of thorough study and research by competent people. Taking a pre-war year, 1912, it is seen that out of 486,940 deaths, 53,900 were due to diseases of the nervous system, and that this number is larger by 6,130 than any other figure in the table; in other words, out of 1,000 deaths from all causes, 110·7 are due to diseases of the nervous system. There can be no reasonable doubt that, in the hands of competent persons, psychotherapy has proved of benefit in the treatment of certain classes of nervous disease. Then, as dealing with phenomena that are in many cases at all events real, these subjects have the same claim to be considered as any others dealing in an orderly manner with natural phenomena.

Let us first examine what I have called the common ground of the three subjects. It is not easy for the layman to give an idea of what is really meant by the Unconscious or Subconscious. As understood by the writer, the psychologist understands by these terms something of the following nature: Imagine a regular cone having a piece, not very large, cut off from the apex at right angles to the axis of the cone. Suppose the man A to be standing, and the cone to be supported with its axis parallel to the ground and on a level with one eye, the other being closed, and the narrow end of the cone towards the eye. At a suitable distance A will see the small circular apex alone; a little further away from the eye he will still see the small end quite clearly, and he will also see a little of the surface of the cone, but less clearly. As the cone recedes he will see more and more of the surface. We may imagine the length of the cone to represent both the duration and extent of A's experience, while the incidents in A's experience are all, without exception, marked on the cone in proportion to their intensity, say, by light and shade. Now suppose A to be reading a book, and let him be reading so intently that he is conscious of nothing but of what he is reading; this state of mind corresponds to his vision of the small end of the cone only. The field of A's consciousness is represented by the narrow end of the cone. If A is reading less intently, he will be conscious not only of what he is reading, but also, for instance, of the ticking of the clock in his room and of the rumble of the traffic outside. This state corresponds to his vision of the small end of the cone, and a little of its surface. It will be clear now that the rest of the cone's surface corresponds to A's unconscious or subconscious mind. Should A attempt to get a view of the whole cone, then if the cone is large, he will not have a clear vision of the whole surface, but by attending to a part of the surface he will have a vision limited as to its clearness only by the quality of his eyesight. Rough as it is, this analogy will serve our purpose

in illustrating some of the matters presently to be referred to. Consider now the following definition or statement of what the unconscious is, and what it can do.

"The Unconscious, as we know, is the seat of memory, the power-house where energy is provided by instinctive emotion, and the supervisor of our physical and mental processes. It is, of course, much more besides. . . . We know that the memory records of the Unconscious are faultlessly exact and finally complete, a veritable 'book of life,' which under some circumstances we may read."*

Again, "The Unconscious mind in its function of supervisor over all our physical and mental processes possesses a knowledge of our true needs infinitely more reliable than that of the conscious. If I suffer from a headache, my suspicion as to its cause is as likely to be wrong as right. Even medical science can make little more than an expert guess at the causes of some of our symptoms. But the Unconscious mind knows—knows without any shadow of doubt. It is therefore better to leave the Unconscious mind to diagnose the trouble and prescribe the antidote."†

If the first of these two statements is inadequate, it is certain that the second greatly exaggerates the powers of the unconscious. We may apply one or two simple tests. When A's attention is relaxed ever so little from his reading, he becomes conscious of the ticking of the clock, and this may remind him that he has an appointment to keep; on our model his attention is now diverted to some particular point on the surface of the cone. Whether A will keep his appointment punctually, or be late for it, or fail to keep it, will depend on many other things beside the rest of A's unconscious mind; it will depend, for instance, on A's sense of obligation to keep a promise made. On the second idea of the unconscious A's moral sense is entirely in the keeping of his unconscious mind. If the memory records of the unconscious are faultlessly exact, it should be possible, on the second idea of the unconscious, by a suitable suggestion or series of suggestions, to recall any or every action of any assigned day of A's life, however many years have passed since that day; while on the first view the site of those actions could not be identified on the surface of the cone by any method whatever. Take the case of the headache, and suppose that A suffers from time to time from this unpleasant symptom of some one of the numerous morbid conditions that cause headache. A reviews in his mind every likely cause of

* *Christianity and Autosuggestion*, by C. Harry Brooks and the Rev. Ernest Charles, p. 77.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 96-7.

his headache—what he has eaten lately, where he has been, and in particular whether he has been in the company of anyone suffering from any infectious disease, what unusual actions he has performed lately; but no cause of his headache is suggested to him whether he uses his conscious mind or whether he leaves the unconscious to diagnose for him. At last, the headaches continuing, he consults a competent physician, and is told that his headaches merely arise from marked astigmatism; proper glasses are prescribed, and the headaches vanish. On the second view of the unconscious this diagnosis and prescription ought to have been made for A by the "Unconscious"! One more example may be considered. Dr. William Brown* describes the case of a motor driver who, in avoiding a collision with another car, ran his own into a ditch, where it overturned. Whether the man was seriously injured we are not informed; but as a result of the accident he suffered from a tremor of the right hand. Dr. Brown describes the case as one of hysterical amnesia (loss of memory) and "bottled-up" emotion. He found the man's memory for the accident was vague and disjointed. Briefly, the treatment was to hypnotize the man lightly, to make him in this condition go through the whole event again with "emotional vividness." It was noticed that during this process, called by the psychotherapeutist "abreaction," the man's hand trembled more violently, but afterwards became steady, and remained steady after the hypnosis. The man was cured. In a case of this kind, which is typical of a large class of cases, the second conception of the unconscious does not appear to help us. Before considering the first method, it may be remarked that there is nothing surprising in the driver's memory for the accident being vague and disjointed; the speed of the events themselves would account for this. On our cone the event itself is strongly marked, so strongly that for this man nothing he can do of himself can rivet his attention to the exclusion of this particular spot on the cone. As a result he experiences, but to a less degree, continuously the nervous effects that he experienced in a maximum degree at the moment of the accident. If this state of affairs is allowed to continue, the man's health will be impaired. Note the mode of cure. Hypnosis is produced, say by fixing the man's attention on the mirror of an ophthalmoscope, or on a faceted diamond held a little above the plane of vision, or by a metronome beating two per second (Brown), or by other methods. With a man of this class such methods would no doubt be extremely effective; with others they would fail, one would estimate the radius of curvature of the mirror, or

* *Suggestion and Mental Analysis*, p. 21.

the relation of the facets to the natural crystalline form of the diamond, and so on. A psychotherapeutist must be trained to judge his patients. Now the man being lightly hypnotised, the events of the accident are reconstructed as accurately as possible so that the part of the cone that represents them becomes familiar to the patient. Its contemplation inevitably begins to lose its effects, the spot no longer stands out so conspicuously, and the patient is cured, or his condition greatly improved.

So far we have seen that when A's attention is riveted on his book he is impervious to ordinary stimulation from outside, he is only pervious to such stimulation when his attention is relaxed; the motor driver was in a similar condition, for he could not accept properly external ideas on account of his attention hovering around one spot of his cone of experience, like a moth round a flame. Those who practise suggestion and autosuggestion contend that the unconscious is more easily approached during normal sleep, that the conscious mind during the waking hours dominates the unconscious mind, so that ideas are more readily received by the subconscious during sleep, and acted upon when the subject awakes. The writer is quite prepared to admit the truth of this, provided its frequency and importance are not exaggerated. In this kind of suggestion where do the ideas that are presented to the unconscious come from ? Unquestionably from the individual's past experience. An example of this kind will be familiar to people in many walks of life. A student has attempted, it may be for hours, to solve a mathematical problem and failed, then having laid it aside, gone on with some other work, then gone to bed without thinking of his problem, has awakened in the morning with a correct solution of the problem in his mind—it has, as the saying is, flashed upon him. There is no denying the fact; but it is not the ordinary way of solving problems. In this case the ideas requisite for the solution had been acquired by the student himself, and we must suppose that they had acted upon his unconscious mind during sleep. There is, then, no reason why ideas should not be imparted to a subject placed under suitable conditions for receiving them, whether by hypnosis or in some other way, so that they may act when the subject is unconscious, and bear their fruit when he returns to consciousness. This method, however, appears to the writer to be fit only for exceptional cases; it is like solving the problem asleep. M. Coué and his followers, as is well known, make boundless claims for the practice of Autosuggestion. They advocate it under the formula, "*Tous les jours, à tous points de vue je vais de mieux en mieux,*" or its equivalent in English. They realize,

too, the danger of directing attention too exclusively to the one point which it is desired to ameliorate, in the so-called "Law of Reversed Effect," which is stated thus: when the will and imagination are in conflict the imagination always wins; and in conflict between will and imagination the imagination varies in direct ratio to the square of the will. In passing, it may be remarked that the use of the nomenclature of the most exact of all sciences in describing phenomena in a subject without any units to which a numeral can be attached is wholly unjustifiable. Dr. Brown (*loc. cit.*, p. 112) gives some apt illustrations of the action of this "Law": "Take an ordinary experience on seeking to sleep. If you are anxious to go to sleep you get wider and wider awake." Similarly with a temporary loss of memory. A man has forgotten the name of a friend, a thing, or a phenomenon, and he finds that no effort of his will enables him to recall the name; yet when he ceases to make an effort of will to recover the name, the name occurs to him. As Dr. Brown points out, the facts have long been recognized, and moreover, that it is a dangerous thing to assert that the imagination is vastly superior to the will. A forgotten name may often be recovered by a deliberate use of the will, not in forcing it to recall the name, but in causing to search for ideas associated with the name. For example, I forgot the name of a mould; on turning my attention to what moulds in general can do, it occurred to me that they could render certain optically inactive compounds optically active by destroying one component in preference to the other, and this was enough to bring back to me the lost name.

In justice to Coué and some, but not all, of his followers, it must be said that the formula quoted above is to be used "in reason." By this it may be supposed that Coué and his more moderate disciples would not claim that the formula would be successful in the case of a person suffering from cancer. With some extreme Couéists there appears to be a distinct tendency to ignore the "in reason" clause, and to suggest that with sufficient faith the formula will work miracles. Take the case of a severe diabetic. Diabetes may now be said to be due to disease of those particular areas of the pancreas known as the islands of Langerhans; the severer the destruction of these regions, the severer the case. One essential function of the islands appears to be the production of insulin, and by means of this definite chemical compound to control carbohydrate metabolism. Now the ordinary person will ask, What good can the Coué or any similar formula, applied with all possible faith in its efficacy, do in this case? My own answer to this direct question would be that the formula would not lead to the

recovery of a single cell of the islands nor to the production of a single molecule of insulin, but that its use might lead to the stimulation of such portions of the islands as remain, and in this way might do some good. In one case a severe diabetic was given a certain injection under the impression that it was insulin, and professed after it that he felt better; very probably he did, from some such stimulus as that just suggested. The extreme Autosuggestionist will go even further, and claim that no small part of our Lord's miracles were due to His being, in the first place, an accomplished psychoanalyst, and, in the second, an adept at the various methods of Suggestion. We are asked, in considering a miracle of healing, say of the withered hand, to remember that diagnosis was not as accurate then as now; that different people, seeing one and the same sort of events, will describe them very differently; to remember that the earliest of our records is not quite contemporary with the events it records; that successful psychoanalysts of our own time have accomplished cures, if not as wonderful as those of the Gospels, yet in some degree approaching them in wonder; to note the analogy between our Lord's methods and those of M. Coué and his followers, and so on. An attempt is being made to trace a sort of neutral zone between miracle and not miracle. As an antidote to this, I would submit that every really Christian man believes that our Lord led a sinless life. If this is so, then it may be pointed out that no sinful man can estimate the powers, or properties, or potentialities of a sinless man. The chemist knows that perfectly pure water has never yet been prepared; he thinks that by measuring such properties of the purest water he can prepare, as he can measure numerically, he can by his formulæ of extrapolation estimate the properties of a water purer than any he has yet prepared; but he fully realizes that such estimates are of the nature of guesses, and are liable to be very wide of the mark. I would as soon claim that our Lord was an accomplished physician in the modern sense of that word as I would claim that He was an accomplished psychoanalyst.

Let us admit, then, that under certain conditions and in some cases Autosuggestion and psychoanalysis in the hands of competent persons may be of use in ameliorating a man's physical and even a man's moral state. Can they be of use in the treatment of a man's spiritual state? Under the same restrictions as those just stated they can. Many illustrations of this could be given, but the case of Dr. Brown's motor driver will suffice. In the case of the medical profession an attempt is being made by those responsible for the training of medical men to provide adequate courses of instruction in psychology

and psychopathology. Sir George Newman* says, "All functional disease may be modified by the mind of the patient, functional nervous diseases are governed by it, and mental disease is its ill-health. Pure psychoneurons or bodily derangements coloured by a psychoneurotic element will provide the general practitioner of medicine with a very large proportion of his most difficult cases." He then points out how little has been done to help the medical student in these matters in the past, and to indicate what is to be done in the future to equip the practitioner to deal with them. Amongst other things, "He must be shown what truth has been admitted by all schools of psychologists to lie in the concept of the Unconscious Mind," etc.

Spiritual ill-health is as prevalent as physical. The Church has recognized this for centuries, and made provision for its treatment; the man who "cannot quiet his own conscience herein, . . . let him come to me or to some other discreet and learned Minister of God's Word." No doubt the extreme autosuggestionist would substitute "Unconscious" for conscience; but the average person will take the prescription as it stands, with this criticism. Discretion may be born in a man, but learning is not. He would like to be assured that provision will be made for the instruction of, at any rate, some of the "Ministers of God's Word" in what Sir George Newman calls psychopathology. This will lay another burden both on those who are to be trained for the Church and on those who have to provide the means of training them; but similar burdens have to be borne in every learned profession. Knowledge increases, and that it does is rather a matter for thankfulness than repining. Meanwhile, for the normal Churchman, if he feels that he ought to practise some form of autosuggestion, what better formula can he employ than this:

> From whence shall my help come?
> My help cometh from the Lord
> Which made heaven and earth.

W. H. Hurtley, D.Sc.

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND THE FAITH

It is probable that most people obtain their first knowledge of psycho-analysis from its therapeutic records, and perhaps there are still some simple souls who are happy in supposing that its chief importance is to support the Church's ages-old methods of dealing with mortal sin. It is dangerous, however, to live

* *Recent Advances in Medical Education*, 1923, p. 138.

in a fool's paradise, and it is time that we realized that, while in certain directions what is called "The New Psychology" does lend scientific approval to a considerable part of Christian *practice*, its most prominent and authoritative exponents are, broadly speaking and on the whole, in direct opposition to the general philosophy and way of looking at life on which that practice is based. Psycho-analysis is much more than a method of mental healing; it is a philosophy, a theory of the origin, nature and destiny of man. And few serious students of its literature can doubt that the "intellectual" difficulties of the next generation or two are likely to be based, for the most part, on the general philosophical conclusions of modern research into the nature and activities of the human mind.

Dr. Ernest Jones is one of the most distinguished among the disciples of Sigmund Freud; when, therefore, he applies the principles of psycho-analysis to the conceptions of Christianity —as he does, directly and indirectly, in his latest volume of essays*—the Christian theologian or student will be wise to consider what he has to say. Dr. Jones's general thesis, if we understand it rightly—and we think we do, though much of it has to be gathered from the implications of a very allusive and elliptical style—is quite clear. To state it in full is impossible here; but his own summary of one of Freud's arguments may be taken as a fair illustration of it:†

"The central dogma itself of the Christian religion—the belief that mankind is to be saved from its sins through the sacrifice of Jesus Christ on the cross—represents an elaboration of the primitive totemistic system. The essence of this system Freud sees in an attempt to allay the sense of guilt arising from the Œdipus-complex—*i.e.*, the impulse, gratified in primordial times, towards parricide and incest, there being good reason to think that this complex is the ultimate source of the 'original sin' described by the theologians. This was the first great sin of mankind, and the one from which our moral conscience and sense of guilt was born. . . . The story of religion is a never-ending attempt to overcome the Œdipus-complex, and to achieve peace of mind through atonement with the Father. . . . The surrender to the Father, the prototype of which is the Crucifixion, is periodically repeated in the ceremony of the Holy Mass or Communion, which is psychologically equivalent to the totemistic banquet. In this way the Father's wrath is averted, and the Son takes his place as co-equal with Him. In the banquet is lived over again both the celebration of the original deed of killing and eating the Father, and the remorseful piety which desires reunion and identification with Him."

It is obvious that nothing like a full discussion of the view of religious origins and conceptions adumbrated in this passage can be attempted in a short article. But one or two remarks

* *Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis.* By Ernest Jones. (International Psychoanalytical Press. 18s.)

† Pp. 415-6.

may be made. The theory is based, as everyone knows, on the alleged disclosure, through the analysis of abnormal mental conditions, of the essentially incestuous character of primitive desires deep-rooted in the infant, the adult, and the race. To the school of psychologists to which Dr. Jones belongs the evidence for this conclusion appears quite irrefutable. But it is relevant to point out two things: first, that the evidence does *not* appear so compelling to certain other authorities in the same field;* secondly, that the theory is, to a large extent, bound up with a view of the origin of various "typical symbols" which is scouted by the most recent investigators of the same problem from the anthropological point of view.† In other words, it is by no means certain that Dr. Jones's theory of religion is not built upon sand. At least we shall be wise, before we accept the superstructure, to wait until the foundations are more secure. Meantime, it may be doubted whether the general reader, intelligently interested in psycho-analysis but unfettered by any preconceived theory as to the details of the interpretation to be put upon the evidence afforded by dreams, morbid symptoms, myths, superstitions and the rest, is likely to be impressed by the arguments and inferences of this book. Frankly, we think some of them are fantastic. On p. 326 the author suggests a certain unconscious phallic basis—it cannot be mentioned here—for the popular interest in aviation, so preposterous as to make the reader wonder whether it is seriously meant. Again, his study of pathological cases in which the patient imagines himself to be God makes him suggest that this God-complex "possibly occurs here and there in all men." From this it is an easy step—on the convenient principle of *ambivalence*, in virtue of which any unconscious idea may display itself in consciousness as itself, or its opposite, or anything in between!—to the conclusion that atheism is a disguised expression of the God-complex (p. 221); or to the suggestion that some of the peculiar features in the creative genius of Mr. H. G. Wells are to be referred to his unconscious conviction that he is a god. Almost without exception, the unconscious ideas adduced by Dr. Jones are, judged by any standard save that of the Unconscious itself, of so disgusting a character that the conclusions based on them cannot be discussed in a journal intended, as is THEOLOGY, for the general reader. We regret this. The author's reputation

* *E.g.*, the late W. H. R. Rivers. See *Instinct and the Unconscious*, and *Conflict and Dream*.

† See, *e.g.*, Elliott Smith's essay in *Psyche* for October, 1922, or his appendix to Rivers' *Conflict and Dream*; and W. J. Perry, *Children of the Sun* and *The Origin of Magic and Religion*. One gasps at Dr. Jones's assertion (p. 201) that the theories of his school on this point are "in entire accord with modern anthropological research."

gives this book a certain importance; and it would be an excellent thing if some competent critic (Mr. R. H. Thouless, for example, if he will forgive us for being so explicit) were to deal with it somewhere else faithfully and in detail!

Dr. Jones is a man of considerable learning and erudition. But though, to judge by his references to authorities, his reading covers a truly vast field, it would not appear to extend either to the New Testament or to the works of Christian writers in ancient or modern times. It would, indeed, be a pardonable exaggeration to say that he has read all the books except the only ones that matter. At any rate, he shows no sign of appreciating the difference between Catholic tradition and Gnostic legend; he is apparently unfamiliar with the Gospel story of the Annunciation (though one of his most elaborate essays is on "The Madonna's Conception"); he is unaware that Christianity is monotheistic; and he thinks that primitive Judaism worshipped a Trinity composed of Father, Mother, and Son (Messiah). Now we cannot, perhaps, complain of the fact (though it must leap to the eye of the most casual reader) that Dr. Jones obviously knows less than nothing of the Christian religion from within, and is writing of something of which he has no personal experience whatever. But this destructive criticism on a basis of intellectual ignorance is another matter, and a serious one. Such ignorance is not unavoidable, and in the case of a man of the author's ability amounts to impertinence. Dr. Jones describes "the Christian myth" as "perhaps the most gigantic and revolutionary phantasy in history." Such criticism as his, based upon an intellectual myopia which only one who had had the privilege of analyzing him could fully explain, is only intelligible as an instance of a mental mechanism as simple and as universal as phantasy—that of rationalization. Or, of course, we may postulate a God-complex.

M. Georges Berguer's book* is in some respects open to the same general criticisms as we have ventured to make of Dr. Jones's. That is to say, the author displays the same general ignorance of the most elementary aspects of Catholic philosophy and Catholic religion. We give one illuminating instance of this (the italics are ours):†

"It was by yielding instinctively to the law of least resistance that [the first Christians] soon began to project the death and resurrection of Christ into the physical realm, to restrict and relegate it to the corporeal, to turn it into a material and organic process *which one could henceforth limit oneself to contemplating from the outside without living it.*"

* *Some Aspects of the Life of Jesus: from the Psychological and Psycho-analytic Point of View.* By Georges Berguer. (Williams and Norgate. 15s.)

† P. 285.

M. Berguer is apparently unable to understand any attitude to our Lord other than that of a Unitarian. His method is first to consider the mystery religions roughly contemporary with early Christianity, and to show how, in his opinion, the Gospel of Jesus was at its source tainted with their "materialism"; secondly, to discuss various features of the Gospel records from the point of view of psycho-analytic doctrine. This second part of the book, in itself, is less startling, and therefore calls for less comment than might have been expected. It may or may not be true, for example, that the story of the Temptation may be expressed by saying that our Lord in the wilderness was offered "precisely the three disastrous issues (magic, delusions of grandeur, perverted mysticism) of introversion"; in any case, this interpretation adds little to our understanding of the story. Nor is it a novel suggestion that when Jesus spoke of the Kingdom He meant "the reign of the Father established in the heart and on earth." The fundamental inadequacy of this book lies in its method of approach to the whole problem created by the life of Christ. The truth is that psychology, which "*expressly excludes the transcendental*" (p. 38), can never get us near the centre of that problem, much less solve it. Fettered by this *a priori* limitation, M. Berguer is driven to the usual desperate shifts to overcome obvious difficulties. The Gospels, of course, "are not *historical* . . . they may be described much more truly as works of *edification*. They endeavour to give an image of Christ which will satisfy the faith of the already existing Christian communities." The simple farewell meal in the upper room "was speedily turned into a feast similar to those of the pagan cults in which the god was, so to speak, ingurgitated by the believer." And so on and so forth—*comme tous les autres!* (We wish, by the way, that all anthropologists, psychologists, mythologists and other students of the parallels between Christianity and ethnic cults could be reminded of a *dictum* by Mr. G. K. Chesterton: "If we are so made that only the Son of God can redeem us, is it strange that Patagonians, and others, should dream of a son of God?") Now, the result of all this is very interesting. It is, so far as we can see, that in spite of a most painstaking and reverent study of the life of Jesus—in which there is no trace of Dr. Jones's supercilious and ill-informed contempt, and the usefulness of part of which we gladly recognize—the Figure which emerges is simply that of a character in history. M. Berguer, we are sure, would discountenance the notion that Jesus is active in the world now in any other sense than that in which all heroes may be said to "live" in their disciples, or that any modern man may rightly *worship* Him.

It may be suggested, in conclusion, that M. Berguer is a pure Manichæan. Many of his strictures of ordinary orthodox Christianity are only intelligible on the assumption that he regards "matter" and "spirit" as so utterly and eternally distinct that any relation between them, any interpenetration of the former by the latter, is to him unthinkable.

Dr. Jones and M. Berguer approach their subject from the scientific point of view. Now, the method of science is the method of framing hypotheses to fit observed facts, and, so long as it leaves no part of the facts out of account, the simpler the hypothesis the better. The fact to be accounted for in the present connection is comprised in (1) the Christian Church; (2) the spiritual experience of millions of people for 2,000 years; (3) the intellectual beliefs of these people. The Christian hypothesis is that the New Testament gives, broadly speaking, a true account of the causes and foundations of this Fact. The writers whose views we have been discussing deny this, and propound hypotheses of which it cannot be said that they are in any sense simple, and which leave part of the facts to be explained altogether out of account. We submit that from the strictly scientific point of view there can be no question as to which hypothesis is to be preferred.

CYRIL E. HUDSON.

COMMUNION UNDER ONE KIND

THE MISSION HOUSE,
COWLEY ST. JOHN,
OXFORD.
February 26, 1924.

DEAR MR. X.,

I will gladly do what I can to give you my opinion on the matters which you put before me, though I am afraid that that opinion will not be altogether to your liking. But I feel sure that your real wish is to know the truth, whatever it may be, and to act on the basis of that truth, when you perceive clearly that you have found it.

I think that the root of the whole matter lies in what our Lord intended, when He instituted the Holy Eucharist. He might have instituted that most wonderful and central Sacrament under one kind. But He deliberately chose not to do so. He first consecrated bread to be His Body, and then He proceeded to consecrate wine to be His Blood. On that occasion He was the sole Consecrator, or in other words, the sole Cele-

brant. The Apostles constituted the congregation. Then, after effecting the consecration, He went on to the administration; and He administered to each member of His congregation, first His Body under the species of bread, and then His precious Blood under the species of wine; and while administering His precious Blood, He said: "Drink ye *all* of It, for this is My Blood of the covenant," thus emphasizing the necessity of a double reception (see St. Matt. xxvi. 27, 28). Every time we devoutly receive the Holy Eucharist, our share in the new covenant is ratified; and in every covenant that God makes with man, the shedding of blood must intervene (see Heb. ix. 15-22), and what is true of the original making of the covenant is true also, as our Lord implies, in the perpetual ratification by His people of His new covenant, which takes place when we communicate. *All* are to drink of the Cup, because that which is in the Cup is Christ's *Blood of the Covenant*, or, as St. Paul reports our Lord's words, is the new covenant in Christ's Blood (1 Cor. xi. 25).

Similarly, in the great discourse pronounced by our Lord at Capernaum, which throws such light on His subsequent institution of the Holy Eucharist, our Lord, in the clearest terms, emphasizes the necessity of a double reception. In that discourse our Lord said (St. John vi. 53-55): "Except ye *eat* the Flesh of the Son of Man *and drink* His *Blood*, ye have not life in yourselves. He that *eateth* my Flesh *and drinketh My Blood* hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day. For My Flesh is *meat* indeed, *and* My Blood is *drink* indeed," etc.

Our Lord did not say, Except you *receive* My Flesh and My Blood, you have no life in you. He emphasized the necessity of two kinds of reception. The Flesh is to be *eaten;* the Blood is to be *drunk.*

The Holy Eucharist is the central Mystery of the Christian life during the present dispensation. Everything connected with it is enveloped in Mystery. Some of its effects are indeed more or less clearly revealed, but there must be a great deal which will not be known until after our Lord's return. In the meantime, the only safe course for the Church is to adhere strictly to what our Lord has taught us about it by His words and by His actions. Any attempt to apply human logic to something so far beyond our ken, is to court disaster. For example, to say that there can be no need for priests who are not celebrating, and for other clerks and all lay people, to receive the Chalice when they communicate, because the precious Blood is present by concomitance with the Lord's Body in the sacred Host seems to me to be inconceivably irreverent and foolish. I am referring, of course, to the opinion which has

become common among Latin theologians since the latter part of the eleventh century.

During the first thousand years and for some time later, the Church faithfully adhered in the Celebration and Administration of the Eucharist to our Lord's teaching and practice. Early in the twelfth century some few Bishops began to introduce a new custom of communicating the laity with a Host which had been dipped in the Chalice, instead of allowing them to drink from the Chalice. Paschal II., who was the Roman Pope from 1099 to 1118, hearing of this novelty wrote to Pontius, the Abbot of Cluny and Superior-General of the whole Cluniac Order. He begins by quoting a passage from St. Cyprian's letter to Cæcilius, another North African Bishop, in which St. Cyprian teaches that in the Celebration of the Eucharist nothing should be done which should be different from what the Lord first did for us. Having quoted the words of the illustrious Bishop of Carthage, Pope Paschal goes on to say: "Therefore, in agreement with the teaching of Cyprian, let the tradition established by the Lord be adhered to, when His Body and Blood are being received, and let no man-made novelty bring about a departure from that which Christ our Master both commanded to be done, and Himself did. For we know that our Lord delivered first the Bread and afterwards the Wine; and we teach and command that that custom should always be observed in Holy Church, excepting only in the case of infants and persons in extreme illness, who may be totally unable to swallow the Bread" (Migne's *Patrologia Latina*, vol. clxiii., col. 442). I quote this passage, not because its main argument bears directly on communicating people under one kind, but because Pope Paschal bases his argument on the wrongness of departing in any degree from what our Lord Himself did and commanded to be done, when He was instituting the Eucharist. The actual novelty which the Pope was condemning—namely, giving the Blessed Sacrament under both kinds simultaneously by dipping the Host into the Chalice—was a far smaller deviation from our Lord's institution than the half-Communion which results from communicating people in one kind only. Still, he rightly felt that in such an important matter even relatively small deviations must be stopped. The only exception which he allows is when it is *physically* impossible for the Sacrament of our Lord's Body to be swallowed, then He allows the Sacrament of the Precious Blood to be given by itself. He is acting on the principle that "necessitas non habet legem." It is not a case of allowing Communion under one kind to enable people to communicate *frequently*, but it is a case of allowing it, when otherwise they could *never* communicate. I should

be ready myself to communicate people under one kind, if they were physically incapable of receiving under both kinds, but *could* receive under one kind.

I now turn to a Roman Pope who lived six hundred years before Pope Paschal II.; I mean St. Gelasius I. His pontificate lasted from 492 to 496. Many of his letters have come down to our time; and one of them deals expressly with the matter which we are considering. It is addressed to two Bishops, Majoricus and John, whose sees were situated, if I remember rightly, in Calabria, or at any rate in some part of Southern Italy. St. Gelasius says: "We have discovered that certain persons in the same region, having partaken only of a portion of the sacred Body, abstain from drinking of the Blood in the sacred Chalice; who, since they have learnt to bind themselves with the fetters of some superstition (I know not which), should undoubtedly receive the Sacraments in their entirety, or else be debarred from them altogether; because *the division of one and the same Mystery cannot take place without* GREAT SACRILEGE, and care must be taken lest such a *pestilent custom* stealthily spreading should induce many to give their consent to what is wicked" (quia divisio unius ejusdem mysterii *sine grandi sacrilegio* non potest provenire, cavendumque est *ne pestilentia* talis obrepens multos in consensum *pravitatis* adducat). The whole of this letter is quoted by St. Anselm of Lucca, the Patron Saint of Mantua, in his *Collectio Canonum* (lib. vi., cap. 134, edit. F. Thaner, 1915, fasc. ii., pp. 331-332).* A passage like this, written by a person occupying the highest position in the Church about 500 years after Christ, clearly indicates the horror which, in those early centuries, was felt at such an audacious departing from the institution of our Lord in such a sacred matter as the Eucharist. Such a proceeding involved a "grande sacrilegium"; it was a "pestilentia," a "pravitas." It had to be stamped out by the excommunication of those who dared to practise it.

I gather from your letter that on some days in the week you have a Mass in your church at 7 as well as at 8; while on other days you are only able to have one at 8. Surely if that be so, it would be better that your communicants, who cannot come at 8, should content themselves with making three or four Communions in the week instead of seven. Daily Communion is a high privilege for those who are living lives which fit them for it and whose other duties leave them time and opportunity for enjoying it; but daily Communion has never been regarded as obligatory on Christians or as being essential to

* On the genuineness of this Gelasian fragment, see the Appended Note on pp. 82, 83, below.

living a devout life. In the early centuries there was everywhere a Mass on Sundays, and there were also meetings for worship on Wednesdays and Fridays; but Socrates tells us that at Alexandria the Wednesday and Friday services did not include the Liturgy proper; and Duchesne, speaking of this matter, says (*Christian Worship*, English translation, edit. 1919, p. 230): "I believe that on this point, as on so many others, the use at Rome was similar to that at Alexandria." If this be so, then in the two greatest Churches in Christendom the Holy Communion was normally administered publicly only once a week. Some Christians may no doubt have been allowed to take the Blessed Sacrament home with them, and may have communicated themselves once or oftener during the week. Holy Communion in those days was never administered publicly from the Reserved Sacrament.

Consequently, for several hundred years in Rome and Alexandria, the great majority of Christians had no opportunity of communicating oftener than once a week. And yet those were the days of the Martyrs and of the great Fathers of the Church. It was the Golden Age of Catholicism. All this seems to me to show that it would be impossible to say that it is so important to provide everybody with the opportunity of communicating daily, that in order to do so, one should be ready to commit sacrilege. Of course, it can never be necessary to commit sacrilege. Only in the case of *physical* impossibility to receive under both kinds would it be allowable to give the Blessed Sacrament under one kind. Then, and then only, there is room for the application of the rule, "Necessitas non habet legem," and even then the application of such a rule should be infrequent. Frequent breaches of any rule tend to destroy the feeling that the rule is really binding. But in your case there is no "necessitas." People who can communicate three or four times a week are much better off as regards that matter than many of the Saints in early times.

I am,
Yours sincerely,
F. W. Puller, S.S.J.E.

APPENDED NOTE ON THE QUESTION OF THE GENUINENESS OF THE GELASIAN FRAGMENT—CONPERIMUS AUTEM

Father Freeston, C.R., in his book entitled *The Sacrament Reserved*, either quotes or refers to the Gelasian fragment at least three times (viz., on pp. 49, 119, and 162), but each time expresses some doubt as to its authenticity. Unfortunately, he never indicates any reason for his doubt.

For myself, I see no reason for doubting its authenticity. The requirement contained in it, that those who refrained from partaking of the Chalice should be excommunicated, merely repeated a similar requirement made by St. Leo, who died about thirty years before the accession of St. Gelasius to the See of Rome (*cf.* St. Leon. Magn., *Serm.* xiii., *De Quadragesim.* iv., cap. v.; *P.L.* liv., 279, 280). The Epistle or fragment of an Epistle under discussion is numbered xlvi. among the letters of Pope Gelasius I. in the *Collectio Britannica* (Brit. Mus. Addit. MS. 8873, fols. 17*b*, 18*a*); and Dr. Reginald Lane Poole, in his *Lectures on the Papal Chancery* (pp. 29, 30), has pointed out that the *Collectio Britannica* makes it certain that Gelasius I. had a Register. In fact, the heading "in libro Gelasii," on fol. 5*b*, implies the existence of a Register. The Epistle is to be found in St. Anselm of Lucca's *Collectio Canonum* (lib. vi., cap. 134, edit. F. Thaner, 1915, fasc. ii., pp. 331, 332); and the Brothers Ballerini, who on such a subject carry great authority, writing about this Anselmian Collection in their very solid dissertation—*De antiquis Collectionibus et Collectoribus Canonum* (part. iv. cap. xiii., *n.* 5; *P.L.* lvi., 329), and arguing that it must have been compiled in Italy, because, among other reasons, it contains so many documents of Italian and Roman provenance, which are not found in earlier collections compiled elsewhere, after giving other instances of this peculiarity, go on to say: "Quædam etiam ex rarissimis epistolis *Gelasii I.* et Pelagii I., *quæ ex Apostolicis scriniis videntur educta*, et ex hac collectione a Gratiano recepta, ex hujus editione innotuerunt." St. Anselm was a much-loved nephew of Pope Alexander II., and would doubtless have special facilities for consulting the registers in the papal *scrinia* at the Lateran when preparing to compile his Collection.

After this Epistle of St. Gelasius had been admitted into St. Anselm's Collection, it naturally found a place in later Collections, such as the *Decretum* of Ivo of Chartres (part. ii. cap. 89; *P.L.* clxi., 182), and the *Decretum* of Gratian (*De consecrat.*, D. ii., c. xii.; *Corp. Jur. Can.*, edit. Friedberg, pars prior, col. 1318). Its incorporation into Gratian made it at once common property. So, for example, St. Thomas (*Summ. Theol.* iii., lxxx., xii.) quotes it as genuine, though he entirely misinterprets it, making it refer to the Celebrating Priest only.

The Epistle is printed as the thirty-seventh among the genuine Epistles of Gelasius in Thiel's *Epistt. Romm. Pontt. Genuinn.*, edit. 1867, fasc. i., pp. 451, 452.

THE PROBLEM OF NESTORIUS

I

To define the distinction between religion and theology is no easy matter, but to exhibit it in a common human experience is a task more simply achieved. To many a boy brought up in the Christian faith, the time comes when his education forces him to consider whether, in the light of what he is learning about the world he lives in, the things he has been accustomed to think of as the truths of his religion can still be regarded as

true. Hitherto he has thought of God as his Maker and his loving Father, who cares above all for goodness, and desires the loving response of good children, who has sent His only-begotten Son to bring forgiveness and freedom from sin to His people, and strengthens them by the gift of His Spirit. He has learned to regard himself as a member of God's Church, united to God through prayer and sacrament, and called to inherit a blessed immortality in the Kingdom of Heaven. But now he is presented with a world which at first sight has little in common with the world as he has pictured it. Human endeavour in an environment of natural law is the appearance which it now begins to wear, and whether he looks outward to the starry heavens or inwards to the depths of his own being, he learns to observe "facts as they are," and to trace within and without the operations of those "laws of nature" which the sciences discover. So far from finding obvious signs of the finger of a loving Father, he is impressed by the obvious indifference to moral values and human aspirations of those forces whose discovery leads to the formulation of scientific "laws." He is driven to reflect upon his religion, and to ask whether, in the light of his new knowledge of "things as they are," he can continue to believe in the Creed as giving a true account of the Universe.

To some these questions do not occur, but to others they do, and where they are insistent in the mind of a religious man they bring the travail pains through which is born a theologian. In reflection upon his religion, in the attempt to understand his faith in the light of his growing apprehension of "things as they are," he will find work enough to occupy a lifetime; and though as time goes on his growing acquaintance with philosophy, history, and the natural sciences may come more and more to illuminate and develop his faith rather than to contradict it, yet it is probable that in this world there will always be in his mind a certain tension, which will only cease when he shall "see face to face" and "know even as he has been known."

There are many points of similarity between this development in individual thought and that development of theology which issued in the formulation of the Creeds. With a simple religious faith, similar to that faith in which the Christian child is trained, the Church entered into the world of Hellenistic culture, and was called upon to face such knowledge of the universe as was given by the philosophy, the history, and the natural sciences of the time. Christianity, as the child of Judaism, had grown up with a religious outlook on the world. God was not "the ultimate reality," or the One as opposed to the many, but Jehovah, the maker and ruler of the world.

Jesus was His Messiah, who had come and died as man to bring salvation from sin and immortality to those who joined His Church and received His gift of the Spirit. But in the world outside questions were discussed of which the earliest Christians had no conception—metaphysical questions concerning the relation of this changing world in time and space to that unchanging reality which alone can be fully intelligible, questions of the meaning of unity, and of the relations between unity and multiplicity. Now a religious faith, such as that of many a young Christian and of the young Christian Church, though it may not be thought out on metaphysical lines, or held on metaphysical grounds, must inevitably involve metaphysical assumptions; and sooner or later must face the question whether its metaphysical foundations are sound. No worshipper of God can be surprised at being asked whether the universe is such as to justify at the bar of reason any worship of God at all; it is still less surprising that so definite a conception of God as that of Christianity should be challenged to produce its rational justification.

There was indeed great need of such a process of thought in primitive Christianity. Without realizing the intellectual difficulties inherent in their religion, early Christians believed their Lord to be both divine and human, and combined a monotheistic horror of idolatry with the worship of Christ as God. Here, clearly, are beliefs and practices which *prima facie* are self-contradictory and absurd. Only by reflection on such metaphysical questions as the nature of unity and the meaning of godhead and manhood could a religion which involved a trinitarian conception of God and a divine incarnation continue to merit and to receive the assent of thinking men.

It is impossible to appreciate the controversies through which the Church arrived at the formulation of such doctrines as the Trinity and the Incarnation unless the necessity of this work of metaphysical reflection is clearly seen. There is to-day in some quarters a tendency to disparage the patristic efforts to think out Christian doctrine in terms of such categories as οὐσία, ὑπόστασις and φύσις. Such terms are held to be "materialistic" or "static," and it is said that what is required is to think of God in terms of such a "spiritual" and "dynamic" conception as "loving will." It is easy to be misled by such language into a facile but fatal over-simplification of the problems at issue. There is, as a matter of fact, nothing specifically "materialistic" about such words as οὐσία, ὑπόστασις or φύσις, or about the Greek thought which employed them. They can be used of active, living, spiritual beings as accurately as of stocks and stones, and in either case the problem

of the relation between that which is and that which becomes confronts us. If God were either " static " or " dynamic," the fundamental problem of philosophy would disappear. But He is both, and so long as we are faced by a changing world in time, whose relation to its changeless source is a baffling mystery, so long must theology refuse to take refuge in the language of religion in order to avoid its metaphysical duties.

Historical study has established the fact that Jesus of Nazareth thought of Himself as the expected Messiah. Was He a deluded fanatic, who had got this idea into His head, whereas the whole Messianic belief was a fantasy of Jewish imagination ? Or was He Messiah, and knew it ? Christianity has been built upon acceptance of the latter alternative; and the logic of that acceptance drove the Church onwards through Nicæa to Chalcedon. Messiahship, if it was to be accepted as an actual fact in the history of this world, was found to involve the necessity of a Messiah who should be both truly divine and truly human. By the time of Nestorius this twofold belief about our Lord was already generally accepted. The condemnation of Arius had declared His divinity, the condemnation of Apollinarius His humanity. But there was as yet no satisfactory answer to the question *how* such a union of godhead and manhood could actually have existed. Apollinarius had tried to supply the answer, and had failed. Undeterred by his failure, Nestorius tried again, and, like his unsuccessful predecessor in the attempt, thought he had succeeded. This conviction of success is the one fact which stands out clearly from his own account of his teaching and controversies, which he wrote shortly before his death, and which is now known as the *Bazaar of Heracleides*.

II

This work of Nestorius, which, after lying hidden for more than a thousand years, was brought to the knowledge of modern scholars in the last decade of the nineteenth century, might have been expected to make clear the views which he maintained. But so far from this being so, it has produced a number of different interpretations of his meaning. It was introduced to English scholars by Dr. Bethune-Baker of Cambridge in 1908 in a monograph,* in which he gave an account of the history and contents of the book, and put forward the view that Nestorius was in reality an orthodox but misunderstood teacher. Five years later Dr. Loofs of Halle, already well known as the editor of the most complete collection of extant Nestorian

* *Nestorius and His Teaching.* (Cambridge University Press, 1908.)

fragments,* delivered four lectures in London, in which he maintained that Nestorius, though certainly unorthodox, nevertheless in contrast with Catholic orthodoxy taught the truth about Christ.† These two rival and contradictory attempts at vindicating the doctrine of Nestorius naturally produced a storm of discussion,‡ and the question of determining precisely what he taught is now generally recognized in theological schools as an exercise for students of doctrine. In his *History of the Christian Church to* 461,§ Dr. Kidd gives a brief and wisely cautious account of the *Bazaar of Heracleides*, and concludes that his doctrine is neither orthodox nor satisfactory.

The work, though originally written in Greek, has only survived in a Syriac translation, and this fact has caused some difficulty. For the most part theologians whose interests are in Christian doctrine are classical scholars, and not at home in Oriental languages as they are in Latin and Greek. English-speaking students of doctrine are mainly forced to depend on the French translation which was made by F. Nau from P. Bedjan's edition of the Syriac text.|| This French translation, though in many ways excellent, and a most valuable contribution to the study of the subject, is apt to break down just at the points where help is most needed, avoiding difficulties in the Syriac version by renderings sometimes ambiguous and sometimes inaccurate. With a view to providing an instrument whereby English-speaking scholars may study the subject further, the Oxford University Press is proposing to publish an English translation which shall aim at presenting with as high a degree of accuracy as can be attained a faithful rendering of the Syriac text. All being well, this translation will appear before the end of the present year, and will enable English readers to study for themselves what Nestorius taught in a version which shall be as near an approach as possible to what he actually wrote. In a number of passages where he is quoting other documents, there are in existence Greek versions of his material. Where this is so it is possible to form some idea both of the honesty of Nestorius as a controversialist and of

* *Nestoriana*. (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1905.)

† Loofs, *Nestorius and His Place in the History of Christian Doctrine*. (Cambridge University Press, 1914.)

‡ *E.g.*, H. M. Relton and A. C. Headlam in *The Church Quarterly Review*, January, 1912, and July, 1915; R. H. Connolly, A. J. Mason, and L. Hodgson in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, xii., 486; xv., 88; xix., 73. C. E. Raven in *Apollinarianism* (Cambridge University Press, 1923), p. 288, speaks of Nestorius' "vindication" as a proved fact, without stating which "vindication" he accepts. From p. 233 *n.* it appears that he follows Dr. Bethune Baker.

§ Oxford University Press, 1922, vol. iii., p. 205 *et seq.*

|| Bedjan, Leipzig, 1910; Nau, Paris, 1910.

the accuracy of his Syriac translator. It may be said that both come out from such a testing with credit.

The *Bazaar* is by no means entirely concerned with doctrinal discussion. It contains three long sections in which the interest is primarily historical rather than theological. In the first, which occupies pp. 146-209 in Bedjan's text,* Nestorius alleges against Cyril of Alexandria the use of violent and unconstitutional methods, accusing him of stirring up strife in Constantinople through his agents, clergy and monks, in that city. He gives an account of how Christians in Constantinople had been troubled by intellectual doubts about the use of the word θεοτόκος to describe the Virgin Mary, and of how he had brought peace to their minds by suggesting the use of a more accurate term, χριστοτόκος. But Cyril continued his iniquities, and the Council of Ephesus had to be called in 431 to try the issues between the bishops of Alexandria and Constantinople. Nestorius claims that he was as anxious as Cyril for this Council to meet, in order that he might press home in public his charges against his adversary. But by an openly scandalous substitution of force for constitutional methods Cyril managed to turn what should have been a trial of the issue between himself and Nestorius into a trial of the latter on a charge of heresy with himself as the chief judge. With an account of the violent and unfair conduct of the trial, which was rushed through before Nestorius' chief supporters were able to arrive, the historical section ceases.

When he next turns from theology to history,† Nestorius takes up the tale where he had left it, at the Council of Ephesus. Another account of those scandalous proceedings introduces the story of the intrigues by which Cyril avoided having his own conduct and the findings of the Council called in question by the Emperor. He was successful not only in his bribery of the imperial representative, but also in his intimidation and corruption of Eastern bishops who had formerly supported his opponent; with the result that the deposition of Nestorius, unheard, misrepresented, and deserted, is accepted by all.

As the Council of Ephesus had been the climax of Nestorius' first review of events and the introduction to his second, so his own final condemnation and exile is the conclusion of the second and the opening of the third.‡ He shows how the Eastern bishops, having thrown over himself for the sake of peace, found not peace but fresh onslaughts on the faith. The tale of Cyril's iniquities is continued, and is followed by an

* Indications of Bedjan's pagination will be found both in Nau's French translation and in the forthcoming English translation. It is therefore most convenient to refer to them. † Pp. 366-406. ‡ Pp. 451-521.

account of the Eutychian controversy. Nestorius sees his own ill-treatment at Ephesus in 431 repeated in the experiences of Flavian at the *Latrocinium* in 449; claims that Flavian and he were in agreement, and had suffered for the same faith; and concludes with an account of the disasters which had befallen the world in divine punishment for the apostasy of the Church. It seems probable that he wrote between the sittings of the Council of Chalcedon in 451, and the ratification of its decisions by the Emperor, for while he never claims for Flavian (and himself) the formal vindication of their teaching by that Council, he speaks of the flight into exile of Cyril's successor, Eutyches' patron, Dioscurus of Alexandria, who is known to have been at Chalcedon when the famous "Definition" was adopted, and to have been deposed for protesting against it.

These historical sections of the *Bazaar of Heracleides* strongly confirm the impression already gained from other sources, that formal heresy was not the only reason for the condemnation of Nestorius.* Rivalry between the sees of Alexandria and Constantinople, personal enmity between Cyril and Nestorius, the determination of Cyril to have his opponent put out of the way and rendered unable to press home certain accusations against himself, all these must be allowed to have played their part. But two questions must be kept distinct which are sometimes too readily confused. Even if Nestorius' condemnation was, as a matter of fact, due to Cyrillian intrigues prompted by fear of exposure rather than love for truth, that does not of itself prove that he was orthodox. His own complaint is that he was never given a fair hearing. Would the result have been otherwise if this had been granted him? That is the question on which it was hoped that the discovery of the *Bazaar of Heracleides* would shed light, but which that work has so far only succeeded in surrounding with greater mystery.

Still its discovery does make it possible for him to be given that fair hearing which for nearly fifteen hundred years the success of Cyril has denied him. In 435 that success was consummated by imperial laws decreeing that all the writings of Nestorius should be burnt, threatening severe penalties to all who should copy, preserve, or read them, and ordering the deposition of any bishop who should venture to defend his doctrines. In view of this, it is not surprising that when in 451 he left on record his defence of himself, he inscribed it not with his own dangerous name, but with that of the blameless Heracleides. As his faithful follower, the Syriac translator, says in the preface to his rendering: "It seemed [therefore good] to the

* See, *e.g.*, Neander's *Church History*, probably still the best account of the controversy, though written, of course, without the aid of the *Bazaar*.

writer to entitle the book with title of this man's name, lest on account of his own name, in that many abhorred it, they should not be willing to read [it] and be converted to the truth—[a book] which he sets as a judge between him[self] and the impious Cyril, speaking and defending themselves."*

III

We have said that one fact, at any rate, stands out clearly: Nestorius' own conviction that he had successfully found a solution of the Christological problem. Moreover, it was not merely a satisfactory solution, he maintained; it was an orthodox solution. He looked upon himself as a scourge of heretics, who, against all error, defended the faith in Christ as truly God and truly man, and truly one. He therefore prefaces to his account of the controversies with Cyril a long discussion of the views of all the heretics he can call to mind. The heathens, the Jews, the Manicheans, the followers of Paul of Samosata and of Photinus, the Arians and the Apollinarians —all in turn come up for review and are confuted. In the course of these discussions, which occupy pp. 5 to 137 of the Syriac text, Nestorius elicits in contrast the true and orthodox Christology as he sees it, and thus stands out, from p. 147 onwards, as the champion of orthodoxy against the oppression and error of Cyril.

His own theory can be stated almost in a dozen words. It is this. Christ is the union of the eternal Logos and the Son of Mary, the principle of the union being that the *πρόσωπον* of each has been taken by the other, so that there is one *πρόσωπον* of the two in the union. Did one know precisely what Nestorius meant by the word *πρόσωπον*, one would know precisely how he thought of the Incarnation, and would be able to decide whether the logical implications of his teaching are those of Nestorianism or of orthodoxy. It is certain that he himself did not wish to teach what is known as "Nestorianism." His denunciations of Paul of Samosata and his followers show that he had no sympathy with those who think of the Incarnation on adoptionist lines, and when accused of "Nestorianism," as on pp. 28 and 69, he indignantly repudiates any such views. The intention of his doctrine is accurately summed up in the heading inserted by the Syriac translator to the 54th section of the first part of the *Bazaar*: "Concerning this: that God the Word became incarnate, and there were not two sons, but one by an union."†

Nestorius, then, accepted as a matter of religious belief

* P. 3. † P. 69.

the faith of the Church in a Christ who was truly God and truly man and truly one, and through reflection on this he produced a theological theory which he thought adequately related this belief to the knowledge of the universe gained by metaphysical investigation. The positive teaching of the *Bazaar of Heracleides* is simply an elaboration of this theory of a *prosôpic* union. With wearisome iteration it is put forward again and again, and is shown to be satisfactory when tested by reference to the teaching of Scripture, the doctrine of the Fathers, the needs of religion and the demands of the intellect.* In contrast to this the "hypostatic union" of Cyril is shown to be unscriptural, unorthodox, destructive of true religion, and unintelligible—unscriptural because it ignores the scriptural distinction between the use of the word "Logos" and "Christ";† unorthodox since it involves, if not Arianism, then docetism or Apollinarianism;‡ destructive of true religion in that it abolishes the work of Christ as High Priest of the human race, undermines the doctrine of the Eucharist, and empties the Atonement of its meaning;§ and unintelligible to such an extent that sometimes one is simply baffled by the contradictions in Cyril's teaching,‖ and sometimes is forced to conclude that he has confused the essential distinction between Godhead and manhood, thus undermining the true humanity of Christ and dishonouring His divinity.¶

It seems probable that in this last point lies the solution of the vexed problem of what was at issue doctrinally between Cyril and Nestorius. Perhaps the most difficult task for Christian philosophy is the thinking out of its doctrine of creation, in which it is essential that man be conceived both as owing his existence to God, and "made of nothing" other than God, and yet also as in a real sense distinct from and other than God. If sometimes we are tempted to abandon the quest as hopeless, it is well to remember that even if we give up our Christianity we do not thereby remove our difficulty. The relation of the temporal to the eternal is no less difficult a problem for the secular philosopher than for the religious. Now in the fifth century the implications of the doctrine of creation do not seem to have been thought out. In the struggle with Arianism the Church had been forced, it seems for the first time, openly to face the question whether or no God could create directly and not only through some intermediate being; and the assertion that the Logos, "through whom all things were made," is "of one substance with the Father," denies the

* *E.g.*, pp. 141 *et seq.*, 364, 49 and 297, 425-6.
† *E.g.*, pp. 141 *sq.*
‡ *E.g.*, pp. 221, 419.
§ *E.g.*, pp. 344 *sq.*, 297.
‖ *E.g.*, pp. 356, 417, 435.
¶ *E.g.*, pp. 323, 332, 346, 440

impossibility of direct creation by God Himself. Before the implications of this assertion had time to be fully assimilated, the Church was stirred by the Christological controversies. In these all parties seem to have assumed a conception of the relations between Godhead and manhood which made impossible any union of the two in Christ, such as the Christian religion demanded. It was not noticed that it would also have made impossible any such direct creation by God as the Fathers at Nicaea had asserted; and was, in fact, a conception belonging to certain strains of ante-Nicene thought which ought to have been abandoned through being found to require an Arian rather than an Athanasian Logos. But Apollinarius provoked reply too soon.

It is the heretics, Apollinarius, Nestorius, and Eutyches, who are the logically consistent upholders of this outworn conception of the relation between Godhead and manhood. Cyril's teaching, no doubt without his realizing the fact, *was* inconsistent, for he had not consciously abandoned this ante-Nicene position, with the result that his positive teaching on the Incarnation, while consistent with the Nicene doctrine of creation, demanded a revision of his conception of Godhead and manhood, a fact which he does not seem to have realized. But, as has happened so often in the history of thought, the inconsistency of a thinker great enough to recognize truth at the cost of his system won for his thought a place in posterity far above that of the barren coherence of his rival.

Nestorius has been called a confused thinker, but careful study of the *Bazaar of Heracleides* makes it clear that whatever he was, he was certainly not that. His few points are repeated again and again with monotonous consistency. His trouble was rather that that confusion in the apparent nature of things which is the challenge to thought was too many-sided for so narrow and precise a thinker as he. The *Bazaar* may be long, and full of needless repetition, but it never contradicts itself, and were it not for two facts, might well be studied in an abbreviated edition. Only first, when a man has been for centuries condemned unheard, it is hardly fair to enforce a closure on the time allotted to him for his defence; and, secondly, when there is difficulty in determining precisely what he is trying to say, it is possible that in the course of often repeating an argument some little variation of detail may give a clue to the meaning of the whole.

We began by considering the relation of religion to theology. When we ask what is to be our verdict on Nestorius in the light of the *Bazaar of Heracleides*, we must keep in mind the distinction between those two. It is quite clear that as a religious

man, in his daily belief and practice, Nestorius was an orthodox follower of the Christian Faith. He worshipped, served, and put his trust in a Christ who was truly God, and truly man, and truly one. But when, in reflection upon that faith, he tried to explain it by metaphysical theory, it is doubtful whether the theory was adequate to the faith—doubtful because of the difficulty of determining precisely what the theory was. From the fact that it arose as the logical development of premisses based on an inadequate conception of the doctrine of creation, it is not probable that the theory was, as a matter of fact, satisfactory. The unjust manner of his condemnation must not blind us to the probable defects of his theology.

If he himself was blind to them, he paid for that blindness with his position and his life, and died believing himself to share the faith of Flavian and Leo. We close the *Bazaar of Heracleides* with thankfulness for the discovery which has enabled us in the twentieth century, if not to vindicate the theology of a condemned heretic, at any rate to sympathize with one who suffered for his honest and single-minded devotion to the light that was in him.

LEONARD HODGSON.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

THE Editor would be glad to be spared correspondence, so far as possible, between August 10 and September 10, and requests particularly that articles for publication may not be submitted during that period.

Among contributors to the present issue, Dr. Hurtley, who writes on Autosuggestion, is lecturer on the Chemistry of Medicine at "Bart's." The Rev. C. E. Hudson is Inspector of Religious Instruction in the Diocese of St. Albans: he contributed the *List of Books on Psychology* which appeared in our May number. The Rev. Leonard Hodgson is Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford.

We beg to draw attention to a masterly paper entitled *St. Thomas Aquinas as a Philosopher*, by Professor A. E. Taylor of St. Andrew's University, published by Messrs. Blackwell, Oxford, price 9d. net. It was read at the celebrations of the Sixth Centenary of the Canonisation of St Thomas, held at Manchester University last May. We thoroughly recommend it to our readers.

The comment on C.O.P.E.C. from Dr. Lyttelton, which we publish below, represents, we believe, a widely held opinion. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the Conference caught the imagination of many people to whom the Church normally fails to appeal. Why was this? We believe that it was because it seemed to portend what at bottom a very large number of our people want. We may call it Social Democracy. That is a different thing from Political Democracy, which promises rather than performs. But Social Democracy is a way of living together based on respect for personality and the human values. And in that the Church has a primary interest.

A correspondent writes with regard to the *List of Books on Psychology* which was published in our May issue:

"In the list . . . no mention is made of Jung's *Psychological Types*, which is considered by its translator, Dr. Godwin Baynes, and other analysts, to be Jung's crowning work. . . . . Two very useful criticisms of Psycho-analysis, lately published, were reviewed at length in the *Times* Literary Supplement of February 14, viz.: *Psycho-Analysts Analysed*, by P. MacBride (Heinemann, 3s. 6d.), and *A Critical Examination of Psycho-Analysis*, by A. Wohlgemuth (Allen and Unwin, 10s. 6d.)."

The Rev. C. E. Martin writes with regard to Prof. McNeile's note in our June issue on the narratives of the Virgin Birth: "What one feels one wants is some evidence that in Jewish law a child born during the period of betrothal and before marriage was considered the legal offspring of the two parties. Can any evidence pointing in this direction be produced, and if so what is its bearing on Matt. i. 19?"

Mr. James Goggs writes to ask whether there is "the slightest shred of Scriptural evidence to support that clause in the Apostles' Creed

which reads, 'He descended into hell.'" We venture to refer our correspondent to Dr. Bigg's note on 1 Pet. iii 19. in the *International Critical Commentary* (St. Peter and St. Jude). The meaning of the clause is fully discussed in Pearson, *On the Creed.*

A grandson of the late Lord Arthur Hervey writes to point out the misprint on p. 342 of our June issue, where his name appeared as "Lord Harvey."

IN THE STUDY

By Rev. W. K. Lowther Clarke, B.D., Edit. Sec. of S.P.C.K.

ADVICE ON BOOKS

If readers who require advice on courses of theological study or the choice of books care to write to the Editorial Department of S.P.C.K., an attempt will be made to give them the required information. Sixpence in stamps should be sent to cover the cost of the necessary correspondence. It will frequently be necessary to refer the inquiry to an expert; a number of well-known scholars have consented to help in this way. Sometimes, especially in the summer months, there may be a little delay in answering. The Editor reserves the right to publish answers if they are of sufficient general interest. In such cases the initials of the correspondents will be given.

STUDIES IN TEXTS

Heb. vi. 4-6.—The A.V. of these verses has proved a serious stumbling block to some who have grievously sinned, but long to find a place of repentance. The R.V. (specially by its margin "the while") has lessened, but not altogether removed, the difficulty, which may, I think, be quite overcome by a still more exact rendering of the different tenses used; if, for example, we render the verses thus: "For it is impossible in the case of those who were once enlightened and tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost" (or "gifts of the Holy Ghost," as some would render πνεύματος ἁγίου without the article) and tasted of the good word of God, and powers of the world to come, and fell away, to be renewing them again to repentance whilst they are again crucifying to themselves the Son of God, and putting Him to open shame."

The distinction between the aorist and the present in "to be renewing whilst they are crucifying" should be made clear, for though this is impossible, yet it is not impossible, thank God, to renew them when by the grace of God leading them to repentance they cease to crucify the Christ afresh. I recollect the case of a man who was deeply penitent for a grave sin committed years before the Mission which I was taking, who longed to come back to his communion, but the A.V. rendering of this passage had hitherto deterred him from so doing.

Note.—It is interesting to see here a reference to Baptism (the Syriac here renders φωτισθέντας by Baptism), Holy Communion (the True Bread from heaven given by God, St. John 6. 32), Confirmation. (Cf. Wordsworth, *ad loc.*)

St. Luke xviii. 15-17; *St. Mark x.* 13-16; *St. Matt. xix.* 13-15.—Is it not quite clear from the masculine Greek for "them," "those that brought them," "them," used respectively in these three passages, that it was the fathers and not the mothers who brought these little ones to the Lord? This would be in accordance with the restraint which would prevent women from approaching a Rabbi. Yet in pictures and windows we find the mothers represented. If the facts were more accurately represented, and we were persuaded of the loving action of the fathers of these little ones, it might possibly encourage the fathers to-day to bring their children to Holy Baptism, instead of so frequently leaving this to the mothers.

Note.—Edersheim (vol. ii, ch. 22, p. 4.), taking it as referring to the mothers, says, "How utterly contrary it was to all Jewish notions, and how incompatible with the supposed dignity of a Rabbi, appears from the rebuke of the disciples."

W. M. MEREDITH.

THE SPIRIT IN THE NEW TESTAMENT*

A SUMMARY of this able book may prove interesting to our readers.

Spirit, according to the primitive Hebrew conception, was an unknown force which interfered with the settled arrangements of the world. *Ruach* in the Bible has no longer any connection with *wind;* the word testifies to an earlier and forgotten stage. Jahveh in the Old Testament is always a God working for moral ends. So when we find *Ruach* without a moral significance, as in the story of Samson, we conclude that it was an originally independent conception brought into relation with Jahveh in our existing records. Belief in one Spirit was a result of the attainment of belief in one God. Spirit appears sometimes as a demonic force which leaps on a man (*e.g.*, Elijah); sometimes as a quasi-material substance which is poured on man. It always works on persons, never on things. We may define it as a mysterious force which makes men *different* from others—mad, for example.

The prophets gave an ethical content to the idea of Spirit, but were reticent until after the exile, owing to the evil associations of early prophecy. The Spirit became definitely the Spirit of Jahveh. The conception was useful because it preserved at once distance and contact between God and man. The Spirit specially presided over the destiny of the chosen people. This is important, for out of such a conception grew the Christian idea of the Spirit filling the Divine Community.

In the later Old Testament we see the beginning of the idea that the Spirit was at work in Nature, but it was destined to fade away before the Greek Logos-conception. In fact, the Spirit as a whole fell into the background in this period. The Hebrew ideas on the subject had merely expressed experience, and Scripture began to take the place of experience. Apocalyptists looked back and forward to a period of the Spirit, but were conscious that they were not living in one.

Coming to the New Testament, we must distinguish between the attitude of Jesus and that of the Evangelists. The latter held a theory that the Spirit was promised by Jesus and bestowed by Him after His death. In order to give it, He must have possessed it in full during His lifetime. Mark teaches that the Spirit descended on Jesus at Baptism

* By E. F. Scott, D.D. Hodder and Stoughton. 7s. 6d.

—permanently, not transiently as upon Old Testament prophets. Matthew and Luke push the endowment further back to the miraculous conception, which is in effect a new creation, the Spirit brooding upon the material as in Genesis. But these ideas are absent from the recorded teaching of Jesus. The few passages in the Synoptic Gospels where they occur can be got rid of. (This is the weakest part of the book. So many theories of this kind, at one time confidently held, have come to be abandoned, that we cannot give a warm welcome to this latest theory.) The Spirit was almost completely absent from the mind of Jesus, and the idea was uncongenial to Him. But, as Dr. Scott expresses it, "the Spirit rested upon Jesus, and for that reason He was unconscious of its presence."

Belief in the Spirit in the primitive Church was of Hebrew origin. It revived in the same circumstances as those in which it arose originally, as an explanation of mysterious happenings. In the earlier New Testament phase the Spirit, as in the Old Testament, was supposed to come suddenly and work intermittently. The wonder which caused the revival was clearly *glossolalia*. Pentecost is Luke's embroidering of a true tradition. The ministry in early days consisted of those who were proved to have the Spirit by the evidence of outward manifestations.

St. Paul introduced a new element, that of Hellenistic mysticism. He never fully reconciled the Hellenistic and Hebraic elements in his thinking and is frequently inconsistent. Spirit for him is the higher principle or life-producing power. Resurrection follows as a natural sequence of the coming of Spirit. Those who have not the Spirit will not rise again. Spirit for him is the organ of revelation, including the (gnostic) mysteries.

The fourth Gospel and other parts of the New Testament are treated more briefly. The Apocalypse is valuable as showing the primitive Christian conception of Spirit.

Dr. Scott's book is likely to influence theological thinking, and scholars should not neglect it. As regards scientific method and literary style, it is a masterpiece. But one lays down the book with profound misgivings. According to the Christian scheme of thought, the Spirit is the very medium in which we live and move. His function is to speak to us of the Father and the Son. As the author says of our Lord, it is possible, indeed inevitable, to live in Him without being conscious of His presence.

Dr. Scott has skilfully described certain stages in human thought, but Christian experience in every religious community would deny that it is possible to reach the underlying reality in this way. Perhaps, however, Dr. Scott has deliberately written a neutral book, assuming the rôle of a religious historian, and would say that the Godward side of the phenomena is excluded from the discussion.

W. K. L. C.

MUSIC IN WORSHIP

A Note on the Report of the Archbishop's Committee.

This Report is now in the hands of all who care to study it. The subject is not new, as the exhaustive bibliography on pp. 51-53 indicates. Moreover, the way had been paved by the National Mission of 1916. Out of this arose a number of enquiries into the conditions under which the

Church of England was then working. Five Committees were set up by the Archbishops, one of which was charged with the task of examining the worship of the Church and of suggesting improvements. It issued a Report consisting of three chapters and an appendix. Chapter iii. (pp. 26-32), nearly one-sixth of the whole, deals with Church Music, and contains a sketch which has been amplified in the Report now before us. The latter contains no principle that is not found in the former, and no fresh suggestions in any way at variance with what is written there.

THEOLOGY cannot find sufficient space for covering the whole ground of the Report. The decisions of the Committee should be read by all clergy, for it has become clear that music is a vital element in worship. Poor music will debase worship, and much of the music rather uninvitingly sung in Church *is* poor. The problem is how to effect the necessary changes in the face of the conservative instincts of choirs and congregations, clergy and organists. Sudden and violent changes, contemptuous abuse of certain hymns and composers of tunes, quarrels with organists, hectoring of choirs—these will not give us what we want. Effective changes can come only through the conversion of all concerned in worship to sound principles and higher standards. The clergy must take the first step, and it is to help them that the following suggestions are offered.

1. The psychological aspect of the question should first be made clear. The music of any age reflects some, at least, of its characteristics. There is an intimate connection between music and morals, as the Rev. H. R. Haweis pointed out half a century ago. Much of the Church music in use to-day was composed between 1850 and 1880. That was an age of unrestrained emotionalism, as may be seen in the plays, diaries, novels and biographies of the time. Men sobbed, women swooned, and both burst into tears with but slight provocation. Their music followed suit. It sobs, cries, languishes and swoons. But we of this day live in sterner times. We have passed through the furnace of war; we have learnt to control ourselves; our music, therefore, must be simple, direct, austere. If we go on using that of an age whose sentimental weakness we have outgrown, we shall be doing violence to ourselves. Congregations have discovered this. They feel the unreality of the position though they are inarticulate about it; they are becoming more and more dissatisfied with the triviality of much of the music which accompanies and should interpret their worship, and they are right. What can be done?

2. "The ultimate responsibility for the music in all parish churches rests with the incumbent" (p. 19). The organist may not usurp it (p. 39), the incumbent cannot divest himself of it. If he is a competent musician, he must decide *what* music is to be sung, and to a certain extent *how* it is to be sung, though the latter is really the organist's province, provided that he has been well trained. If he is only a mediocre musician, he must take pains to improve himself; if he is irredeemably unmusical he can (*a*) hand over musical matters to the organist, if the organist is something more than a mere organ-player, and is first and foremost a good churchman; (*b*) form a Music Committee (p. 40); (*c*) put the whole matter into the hands of a Committee of the Parochial Church Council (p. 40); (*d*) appoint a Director of Music to control the music, the choir and the organist (pp. 18, 40). Local circumstances; the age, attainments and temperament of the organist; the efficiency of the choir—these and other considerations must decide what he will do, but the aim should be to put an end to drifting, and to get the congregation to feel that music

in worship must be taken seriously, and that if it is not a help to worship, it is a positive hindrance; there is no neutrality about it.

3. How is the congregation to be converted to sounder standards? As has been mentioned, there are stirrings of better things abroad, arising from the growing dissatisfaction with much that is sung in Church: but when concrete experiments are begun, when Mr. X. no longer hears his favourite Mass, or Mrs. Y. her dearly loved hymn tune or florid Anglican chant, reaction sets in. What is to be done? Go on persuading, practising, explaining. Tentative and gradual changes will show people what good music and good singing is, and they will soon lose their acquiescence in what is trivial and uninspiring. If they say "The old is good," tell them that what they love is not "old" at all; it is modern—and fifty years old; we must go behind that to the older music which is characteristically English, but was ousted by the passing attraction of weaker foreign influences. Congregational practices (p. 18) are very helpful, but require tactful handling, and should not be too frequent; a great deal depends on local conditions.

4. Encourage unison singing (p. 13). It can give magnificent results, and need never be dull if the organist knows his business. On p. 16 is a valuable suggestion: where good part-singing is unattainable, train a quartette or double quartette of "chanters" to sing in parts, and let all the rest of the choir, together with the congregation, sing in unison. This is the foundation of Descants and Faux Bourdons; in this way many hymns can be turned into congregational anthems, increasing both the musical interest and the devotional effect.

5. In a sung Eucharist it is a wise plan to allow the people's part—viz., *Kyrie*, *Creed*, *Sanctus* and *Gloria in Excelsis*—to remain fixed—*i.e.*, to be sung to one setting only. There is nothing better than Merbecke, and the repeated use of it will allow the congregation to do what they have a right to do—to sing their part. No printed copies will be necessary. But care should be taken to select the best accompaniment. Not every edition is correct—it is safe to recommend Harwood's, Martin Shaw's, and Bucknall's.

6. Do not overlook the value of silence (p. 17) and the use of the natural voice (p. 24). Singing and playing are worthy of something greater than the task of covering up the noise of footsteps. Monotone is out of place in several parts of the Communion Service, in Matins and Evensong before the versicle "O Lord, open Thou our lips," and after the Third Collect.

7. Harmonized Responses should be unaccompanied. If the choir cannot sing them without reliance on the organ, they should be said or sung in unison (p. 26), the congregation sustaining the melody (which is in the tenor, as the word implies) and the "chanters" singing the harmonized accompaniment without the organ.

The time is ripe for well-considered changes in the choice and performance of Church music. Here and there clergy may be apathetic or despairing, organists of narrow outlook may offer passive resistance, choirs may be sensitive of interference, congregations may suffer from the tyranny of custom and association; but the movement is spreading, and we may be thankful that so strong and representative a Committee has given us a lead by a unanimous Report. Its nineteen members have done a great work in showing us how good music, practised and sung with care, enthusiasm, and reverent humility, can help us to offer God something worth offering.

W. H. David.

INTERCESSION*

My Brother Priests,

It falls to my lot to speak of the Mystery of Intercession, in its special aspect as one of the "God-ward energies of a Priest." And by "God-ward energies" I gather that our thoughts are to be directed to a Priest's personal life—known indeed, to God and to himself, but unknown to the outside world. If this be so, we are treading on very sacred ground; and who am I, in my unworthiness, that I should venture to tell of it to you? You will bear with me.

In these critical days we are faced, both as a country and as a Church, with most difficult problems. What will the future bring forth?

There are numerous earnest Christian people who have set themselves to theorize and to plan for the betterment of things. But the spiritual Act of Intercession lifts us up to a higher altitude than this, for it ushers us into the region of the supernatural.

What is the great essential Truth that vast numbers in these modernist days fail to grasp? It is simply this—that the Christian Faith is a Supernatural Religion—or, it is nothing. A Religion which begins with a supernatural birth, a Religion of which the Founder, in His omniscience, has so used His own Laws of Nature as to work what we call "Miracles," culminating in the Miracle of the Resurrection, and of the supernatural outpouring of the Holy Spirit—a Religion of which the whole sacramental system is supernatural—this is the only Faith that is stronger than this transitory world, the only Faith that is of any use to myself. And in the very heart of it there glows, like a beacon light, the Mystery of Intercession.

With diffidence I would suggest, as a starting point, that we, each one, have to know accurately where we stand in this matter as regards our own Faith. In what does the secret of the power, frequently the miraculous power, of Intercession lie? It is rooted in the yet greater Mystery of the Incarnation of the Lord Jesus Christ. Because of this, God and man are united together in the Person of His only Son. A supernatural element has entered into our lives. "We are members of His body, of His Flesh, and of His Bones," says the Apostle. We have become "Fellow-workers with God." He is closer to us than the air that blows upon us. We are not isolated units, praying alone: we intercede in the midst of God.

See how the Lord permits His members to participate in His own great work. Though "He ever liveth to make intercession for us," yet it is wonderfully moving to note how He has vouchsafed (if I may dare to say so) to leave His own chalice of Intercession, which He is ever holding up before the Father, not quite full, in order that we also may pour our intercessions into it, to be immediately fused into His own. We bring our little chalices of Intercession, that they may fill to overflowing the chalice of our Divine Elder Brother. And, always, we offer our petitions "through Jesus Christ our Lord."

Herein lies the secret of the tremendous power of Intercession. "I am the Vine-stem," saith the Lord, "ye are the branches. If ye abide in Me, ye shall ask what ye will, and it shall be done unto you." Is not this too good to be true? It is as though we are plunged into water out of our depth, that we may learn to swim. But we shall not sink, for "underneath us are the Everlasting Arms."

* A paper read to the Anglo-Catholic Priests' Convention held at Bournemouth in June, 1924.

St. Peter was in prison, awaiting, as he thought, his execution. "Prayer," we read, "was made without ceasing of the Church unto God for him." Forthwith, the prayer worked its miracle. Stone walls and double chains, soldiers and gaolers and iron gates, all gave way before the power from Heaven which that intercession brought down. The whole Erastian forces of the Roman Empire were mere child's play when confronted with the intercessions of the Church of God, and with the resistless Life of the Son of God coursing within her. And if intercession prayed in Christ worked its miracles for the Pentecostal Church of Jerusalem, can it not still work its miracles for the Pentecostal Church in England? Why have we come to the plight we are in to-day? Because we are not daring enough in our petitions: we offer them without a vivid Faith. I think it is Andrew Murray who says, "If the prayer which is to be effectual is indeed the Breath of God in man, then tens of thousands of people are suffering from the malady of suspended spiritual animation." When we ascend to the Altar of God, to plead there, in union with the Great High Priest, for the nation and for the whole Church, visible and invisible, and for conversion of sinners, we could pray down a great part of the prejudice and infidelity that are at present such a hindrance and tragedy. "As a prince thou shalt," etc.

But difficulties suggest themselves. How are we, in our finiteness, to know that we are asking in our petitions for what He will that we should ask? My brothers, in every sacramental Communion of Him, His own Nature is imparted to us. "He dwelleth in us, and we in Him." As one of the Fathers says, "Thou dost mingle Thy Body with our body, and dost blend thy Spirit with our spirit." If, in very truth, we offer our intercessions in and with Jesus Christ, does it not therefore follow that we fall in, at the same time, with His purposes and Will? My fingers are, physically, a part of my hand. But what the hand is prompted by the mind to do regulates that which each of the fingers does. The hand cannot move in one direction and the fingers in another. "We are the Body of Christ, and members in particular." Therefore, we shall be moved to pray for what Christ wills; and what Christ wills, the Father approves, and will, in His own time and way, bring to pass. Do not the ancient Collects teach us this, as they end, one after another, "through Jesus Christ our Lord"? Prayer works in a circle. The Lord carries us along with Himself in His own great plans. He will put into our hearts what to ask.

But, after all, we are but human. How difficult it is to creep out from our own self-sustained efforts when we pray. There is, in the case of many, the inability to concentrate their thoughts for long together. Indeed, some of the most illustrious saints of God, who have left any record of their spiritual life, have had to confess to distractions in prayer. Could we, at such times, just mention the particular objects or names that we desire specially to remember, and ask our Lord Himself to supply the language? We do not need to be always casting about for words of our own: nor is there absolute necessity to enter into full details, when we speak to the Omniscient God. His strength is sometimes made perfect in our weakness.

My brother priests, many of you are far higher up in the spiritual ladder than myself, who am only on the ladder's lowest rung. I can but ask you to forgive me if another point, about which I am drawn to say just a word more, seems too elementary and simple. It is this:

Do we pray vividly for others? We have to visualize the circum-

stances of those for whom we intercede. As an example of what I mean take the case of a man condemned to a long term of imprisonment (possibly for years). He has had no chances; his heart has grown hard; he loathes the walls of his cell; almost he curses God as well as his own circumstances. Let us visualize the recklessness of his despair. Realize for yourself the suffocating contraction of four blank walls. Carry that prisoner on your own heart; lift him and all the circumstances of his existence up to the Great Intercessor, identifying yourself with the man himself. Be the criminal. "Father, forgive me, for I know not what I do." There can be nothing cramped or stilted on our side: we have to take upon us for the moment the actual condition of him for whom we plead. Intercession is real work, not merely repeating printed petitions out of a Manual. It takes a great deal out of the priest as he pleads in union with the Heart of Him of whom we are told that He offered His Prayers to the Father "with strong crying and tears."

Shall I add that, in our hidden life with God, while Manuals of Intercession are indeed helpful, yet they are more or less crutches for human infirmity. We, when alone with God, have to aim to be quite simple and natural, our spontaneous, unadorned selves, not cramped within a stiff groove.

My brother priests, it is a deep joy to see how this great movement for the conversion of sinners is deeply rooted in the all-important Act of Intercession. Throughout the length and breadth of the land, from town to town, from village to village, the unceasing chain of petition moves on in union with our blessed Lord. Night makes no break in it: there is no imperfect link in the chain. It is a magnificent thought to carry along with us. We are fellow-workers with God, and God's work must triumph in the long run. No consciousness of our own individual weakness, no fear of the odds against us, should be able to depress us. We are on the winning side: we are workers with God.

My brothers, may we indeed work forward to the conversion of England and the world!

Well, we are in the midst of the season of Pentecost, and Embertide, with its many sacred associations, is upon us. I myself am in the evening of my life, but as I speak to you, it seems only yesterday when I received my commission for "the office and work of a Priest in the Church of God." We, each one of us, had our ideals, as we came fresh from our Ordination, all aglow with enthusiasm; we were going to do such great things for the Master, were we not? And to-day our hearts go forth, and our earnest intercessions rise up to Heaven, in behalf of those dear young fellows to whom the Lord will entrust the supernatural gifts of ordination next Sunday, as His representative breathes upon them, and says, "Receive the Holy Ghost." They, as they go forth in their young vigorous life, to help in exalting Christ to His proper throne among the children of men, will do wonderful things in His strength. And we rejoice to-day, for our young brethren's and companions' sakes, that the opportunity is to be given to them of taking up and carrying to more perfect fulfilment the tasks which we, in our own short lives, shall have left unfinished.

One word more. Shall the world indeed be converted? We, at least, will do our best. I am sure that, in its heart of hearts, this world is religious, for I believe absolutely in the Presence of God in human nature. Get almost any lad in England quietly by himself. I care not what may be his record or his environment. Speak to him manlily and

naturally about "the things that matter most," and, sooner or later, you have won him: for you have touched that spiritual instinct within him which he himself never knew the existence of. Moreover, at the bottom of much sin there is far more ignorance than vice. Our blessed Lord understands that. He never makes mistakes, but sees us truly, when all the world is wrong about us. He weaves into one vestment all our characters, including the criminal, the infidel, and the outcast, and He wears the vestment Himself. All around are human lives that, to ourselves, may seem dull and hardened—perhaps they are darkly stained with sin. But they only need the touch of the Hand of Jesus to bring out the radiance of the Divine Image hidden within. We, members of His Body, offer ourselves to-day to be the Hand of Jesus to at least some of these marred and lustreless lives. "As the Father hath sent Me, even so send I you." We are not outsiders, not freelances, not critics: we are duly commissioned ambassadors of the most High God.

We go forth, strong in our Faith, with His thoughts in our minds, and His works in our hands, to plead for the people, one by one, and in union with Himself, in prevailing intercession.

W. F. La Trobe-Bateman.

THE CHURCH AND THE BIRMINGHAM CONFERENCE

The grand effort made by Churchmen and Nonconformists last Easter to "deal with" present-day social questions was marked by an enthusiasm blended with sobriety of judgment and thoroughness of preparation such as evokes admiration and sympathy from all quarters. It can hardly be doubted that, even though the complexity of the problems outstrips and eludes the most powerful minds in the country, a great increase of interest and knowledge of the subject has resulted from the formation of study circles, the discussions, the printed reports and the aftermath of conferences and co-operation, which hitherto has shown no sign of languishing. It cannot be that such unsparing and devoted labour should fail to bring the community nearer to the point of inaugurating an era of progress and quickened hope.

Further, we may confidently assume that so much joint effort between members of different denominations has given fresh impetus to the desire for Reunion, for more mutual knowledge and genuine concord. It is widely acknowledged, indeed, that while divergences of principle and the legacy of past centuries will continue a long while to perpetuate outward division, nothing but good can come from Christians banding themselves together in an endeavour to "bring the principles of Christ to bear" upon the bewildering tangle of modern civilization.

The above phrase, however, quoted from the preamble to the "Copec" reports, suggests the question whether all those who took part in the Conference were quite clear in their minds as to the real object of the whole movement. For a little reflection on the matter makes it clear that two large and miscellaneous groups of human beings may easily be impelled to vigorous activity and apparent unity of aim by two essentially different motives, which yet to a superficial observation present an appearance of identity. They may roughly be described as secular or eternal: those concerned with the "bettering" of society, or those which have to do with the training of character for another and higher state

of existence. No one set may be thought of as "in the best sense worldly," the other as heavenly. All who by temperament and training are in sympathy with the latter cannot refrain from misgiving when they see fellow-Christians, apparently unwitting of the greatness of the issues at stake, joining hands, not only with members of widely sundered denominations, but with many who propose no religious aim whatever; and whose motives may be, and sometimes certainly are, almost wholly self-regarding—that is to say, not only secular but selfish.

A perusal of those volumes of the Report which deal with the principles of the social work of the Church shows that in almost every page the importance of determining the relation between Church work which is secular and that which is directed towards Eternity has not been adequately estimated. Religious, in a popular sense, these chapters certainly are. That is to say, there are many appeals to the teaching of Christ and to Christian principles, some, not so many, to the need of prayer. But it will be noticed by careful readers that religion is generally brought in as ancillary to the *main purpose*—viz., the making of this present world a more habitable place than it is. As the subject is pre-eminently liable to confusion, it is advisable to show clearly the chief motives which are indicated in these volumes, and one or more of which must have impelled every group of individuals who have taken part in the movement. We shall then be in a position to consider their relation to each other and to the Divine Revelation as given in the teaching and work of the Incarnate Son of God.

Let the following tabular statement, then, be taken as a rough synopsis of the aims and motives which find expression in varying degrees of emphasis in the volumes before us. We begin with the lowest.

Mainly self-regarding.	1. Desire to secure possession of material goods. 2. Dislike of unsightly objects, slums, etc. 3. Desire, based on belief in the British Empire, to strengthen physically the British stock. 4. Desire to avert revolution and war.
Mainly altruistic.	5. Desire to give fuller life to workers. 6. Desire to help forward young and struggling nationalities. 7. Desire to beautify human life. 8. Desire to improve intellectual education. 9. Desire to allay suspicion and strife at home and abroad.
Mainly moral.	10. Desire to improve the character-training of the young. 11. Desire to maintain or recover the British name for fair dealing in commerce all over the world. 12. Desire to purge our industrial life of fraudulent and antisocial practices.
Partly Theistic.*	13. Desire to plant a spirit of brotherhood among the young based on divinely revealed principles. 14. Desire to do the Will of God by combating evil wherever it shows itself.

* It may be objected that 13 and 14 are moral only. This may be admitted as in many cases probable. But they should be discriminated from the rest as being professedly based on Law, not only human, but Divine.

The question now arises, How many of these may be said to be based on considerations which are almost entirely secular, or on those which mainly have reference to Eternity? The answer is that they all belong to the former group. But to justify that answer we must turn to the New Testament. In so doing, let it be noted that we are in quest of a solution of a question which has formed the theme of unnumbered discussions for the last fifty years, discussions prolonged, wearisome, and acrimonious, but hitherto undecisive—that is, how far is the Church committed to social reform?

It ought not to be necessary to quote texts indicating that God's claims on the *minds* of His children are paramount, because the proposition is involved in our idea of His greatness and transcendence. Matt. iv. 17, the opening sentence of our Lord's ministry, is enough by itself. But the change which has come over the word "Repent" since the year 1611 makes it necessary to insist that the scope, the depth and massiveness of the gracious and tremendous words can only be gauged if we paraphrase into modern English "Think differently of all great matters—human life, God, Sin, Duty, Heaven, Hell, etc.—because the Sovereign Lord of all is near to you."

Now it will hardly be disputed that the emphasis here laid by Christians on the primary duty of thinking rightly is especially cogent for us Europeans to-day, seeing that our tendency is to appraise action as more important than thought. Two other passages may be mentioned. When Christ was asked "Which is the first and greatest commandment?"—*i.e.*, "What is the main principle on which we should conduct life?"—His answer was, "To love God wholly and supremely"—*i.e.*, he added feeling to thought. Then after the event on Calvary and the Resurrection of the glorified Body, just before the Ascension, He laid upon the Apostles the command to "go and teach."

But it is very needful for us to conceive of the Incarnation as an event so stupendous, so ineffably deep in meaning and all-embracing in its effect, that for those who know anything of the mystery of God's Love there cannot possibly be any duty which, for a moment, could take precedence of that of imparting to others what we have learnt of it from God through Christians. Further, as a plain corollary from this, if to anyone this proposition is inadmissible, he must, consciously or not, be conceiving of Christians from the Socinian standpoint, not from that of the New Testament and the Christian Creeds.

If, then, that which has been baldly stated here is attentively reflected on, it will cease to be a matter of surprise that very nearly the whole of Christ's instructions on the *practical* duty of the Church are concerned not with any outward readjustment of conditions, but with teaching: especially as we all agree that teaching is effective only when words are enforced by example. Hence, in so far as He laid down precepts as to conduct, they were not in the way of advice as to bettering this world, but illustrations of the claims made by a Creator of infinite Love, and, if that Love be rejected, of infinite severity. Those claims first concern our thinking, then our outward actions. Thus all the texts quoted in one of our Reports as indicating Christ's concern for social reform are rather illustrations of the metanoia which He enjoined, the spirit in which we should deal with problems as they come before us if we vividly realized the Presence, the Nearness and the Majesty of our Heavenly Father. If, on the other hand, we take them as practical precepts referring to

social reform, we find ourselves obliged to acknowledge some—which were mostly known before—and ignore the others as unpractical or Utopian. What is common to them all is that they give us a picture of how men's thoughts and feelings would show themselves, if we began by realizing our true relation to our Master.

For example: "Love your enemies." Any honest man whose thoughts are concerned with this world only must admit that those are the words of a visionary; and by all worldly-minded, eager citizens in every nation they are quietly ignored, or, rarely in England, openly denounced. But to those who are earnestly and humbly seeking *first* the Kingdom of God and His righteousness, they indicate the direction in which we are to strive. Or Matt. vi. 19, the prohibition against storing. Observe the supreme mastery of the unseen facts here exhibited. Unless Christ had been sure that some gift of the Higher Life was being prepared for man—unless, that is, He had foreseen Pentecost—He never would have uttered injunctions manifestly impossible for us "children of this world" to fulfil at present, but wondrously adapted to turn our thoughts Godwards, to a region free from the grinding tyrannies of custom, from the blindness of an age when prophecy is almost dead, from the narrow bondage to sense and finitude. It sounds profane, but it is really reverent to say that without Pentecost the Sermon on the Mount is nonsense.

The truth is, there are two interpretations of human life, and we are nowadays being summoned to choose between them. We are in this world either to make ourselves or others temporarily happy—that being our first aim—or in order that our characters may be trained for Eternity. In theory, we all believe the latter, but the influences which constrain us to give our energies entirely to the former almost amount to a compulsion, especially for those who have to struggle anxiously against destitution and despondence. Yet it is not going too far to say that, if as a community we could all keep in mind the eternal interpretation of life, all our social work would be inspired by a new kind of hopefulness. But it would have to be a very complete change of mind, and we English are fatally inclined to stop half-way.

In two principal respects there would be a change in our methods of grappling with social problems, a change, we mean, which would be operative at once. What further, deeper results there would be no one could forecast; except that they would be far more glorious than we can imagine.

1. Instead of fretting about our perplexities of thought, we should welcome them. Jesus, when difficulties as to the conduct of life were referred to Him, never simply explained them away, but always suggested new ones. Indeed, the whole of His teaching and His work for men added immeasurably both to the theoretical and practical problems of life. Without the gift of the Holy Spirit such a way of dealing with mankind would be cruel. With it we can see that even for our perplexities we can be grateful, for they teach us to lean on Him Who guides us into all truth of thought, and enables us to persevere in action. But in our conferences as in our conversation and our writings and exhortation it is generally taken for granted that we—or more likely others—are to blame for the fact that all the problems of life are not simplified and smoothed away. But if they were we should cease to grow. Character is built up by our having to make decisions. Here, as in countless other ways, we are

"thus blindly with our blessedness at strife." It is sheer insanity to suppose that we should be happier if we were less perplexed. Indeed, the smooth, smug life towards which we constantly strive would, if attained, prove to be a nightmare of stagnation and weariness without hope. Why can we not see that this is a law of God's training of His children?

2. Similarly, in practical matters, we should recognize the folly of far-reaching programmes and the glory of being allowed to take the next step in perfect confidence that it is pointed out for us by the Holy Spirit. For instance, instead of being disheartened by the appalling difficulties which crop up when we try to co-operate with foreign peoples in international affairs, why can we not recognize in those very difficulties the call of God to back up the League of Nations; not because it is certain to be successful, nor because all other alternatives are merely crazy, but because the League is the simplest expression of our wish to obey our Master? If we are genuine in our desire to follow Christ's teaching, we shall give our energies vigorously to supporting the League, and cease to say that the Sermon on the Mount is unpractical. It is only unpractical for those who prefer wasting their breath in uttering hollow cant to raising a finger or spending a shilling for the saving of civilization. Or, again, the slum problem—a very much larger one than what is called the Housing Question—must not be approached by frontal attack. That is to say, we are not to trust to any motive, be it simply compassionate or imperial or narrowly patriotic or sentimental. What we are commissioned to do is to spread the message of the Gospel—that is, the nearness of the unseen but Almighty Creator—and if that is to be done slums and overcrowding must be felt to be intolerable; the strongest reason by far being that, if we tolerate them, it is proof that we don't really care to be obedient. To put up with the stumbling-block is to defy the Master who charged us to press forward on the narrow way. The practical work, then, of the Christian Church is to rouse the conscience of the whole community by "insisting, in season and out of season," that for the children's sake, who are longing to hear about God and to see signs of His Presence in their surroundings, these horrors which forbid His Epiphany must cease. Not because clean dwellings and fragrant streets would save the Empire—though they would go a long way towards it—not because health of body helps to uplift the spiritual life—though it certainly does—but because we, as a Church, have not yet begun to obey the Saviour's command, and yet we profess to believe in a Day of Judgment.

SUMMARY.

If, in this matter of social reform, eternal issues are at stake, it must be that something infinitely greater than any temporal welfare depends on what we say and do now—namely, the recovery of the conviction of the nearness of God, transcendent, but self-imparting: since the recognition of our own helplessness is the first condition of our Creator's working actively for our salvation. Sham utility is a poor test of obedience. Submission to His will is the liberation of His saving power: for only if men learn to love and fear Him do they come to reverence His Law and aspire to co-operate with Him, and that depends on the knowledge of Him in which stands our eternal life.

E. LYTTELTON.

REVIEW

Le Père Lallemant. La Doctrine Spirituelle du P. Louis Lallemant de la compagnie de Jesus précedée de sa vie. Paris: J. Gabalda. 5 fr. 1924.

In the fifth volume of his great work *Histoire Littéraire du Sentiment Religieux en France* Henri Brémond describes a mystical school which, while little known and for some time under suspicion, is now recognized as representing the best spirituality of the seventeenth century. Its founder, the Jesuit Louis Lallemant, died in 1635, leaving no written work behind him. Among his disciples the Père Surin alone was famous, and his tragic story is still the subject of controversy. The school itself would have been forgotten, unless towards the end of the seventeenth century the Père Champion had exerted himself to revive the memory of it. Pierre Champion was born in 1632, three years after the death of Louis Lallemant, and he made his studies at Caen, still an active centre of mystical life. From 1680 to 1701 he was at Nantes, whence he made frequent visits to Brittany. Here he met the Père Vincent Huby, the disciple and spiritual heir of the Père Jean Rigoleuc, who was himself the devoted disciple of Lallemant.

The spiritual teaching of Lallemant was carefully collected by Rigoleuc, who was born in 1595 and died in 1658. The summary he made of it was faithfully preserved by Huby, and was published by Champion in 1694. It was a moment when mysticism was attacked and suspected, but Lallemant was so strict a scholastic and so loyal a disciple of St. Ignatius that his authority was everywhere unquestioned. His place among the Jesuits of France was similar to that of Alvarez among the Jesuits of Spain. He had contemporaries who were more brilliant, but there was no wiser or safer guide to the spiritual life. "This modest book," says Bremond (*Hist. litt.*, v., p. 64), "is one of the three or four essential books of modern religious literature. As a grammar of mysticism, as a manual of initiation for the contemplative life, there is nothing better. It is true, of course, that Louis Lallemant does not attain the heights of Ruysbroeck, Tauler, Suso, Theresa, John of the Cross, Francis of Sales; but it is necessary to begin with him. And we return to him again and again, because, better than anyone else, he teaches the essential principles of mysticism, and its divine simplicity."

Lallemant carefully insists that there can be no progress in the spiritual life, until first there has been a thorough purga-

tion of the heart. "You will sometimes see people," he says (*La doctrine spirituelle*, p. 232), "who make, they tell you, the prayer of simplicity, or who take the divine perfections for the subject of their meditations, and yet they will be full of errors and gross imperfections. The reason is that they have climbed too high without having previously purified their heart. After all, it is necessary to send them back to the first elements of the spiritual life—that is to say, to the guard of the heart, as at the beginning of their conversion—if they are to make any progress." "God lays the foundation before He builds the house, and this foundation is the knowledge of ourselves and of our miseries" (p. 232).

If we are to help others, our power to do so will depend altogether on our union with God and our perseverance in prayer. "It is certain that a man of prayer will do more in a year than another in all his life" (p. 115). "Every preacher ought to render himself extremely dependent on the spirit of God. The principal preparation for the pulpit is prayer and purity of heart" (p. 228). "Be very sure that in the functions of our ministry we shall bear fruit only in proportion to our union with God, and our detachment from our own interest. A preacher who can draw a crowd, a missioner who makes a stir, a confessor whose confessional is thronged, a director who has become the fashion, all flatter themselves that they bring forth much fruit, and judging by appearances, one might believe it. But are they united to God by prayer? Are they perfectly detached from themselves? Are they actuated by heavenly motives? Let them take care not to deceive themselves. They are employed in works of zeal and charity, but is this from a motive of zeal and charity? Is it not, perhaps, because they find in these works their own satisfaction, and that they have no love for prayer or study, and cannot stay quiet in their room or practise recollection?" (p 316).

A constant theme with Lallemant is the work of the Holy Spirit, and the relation of the soul to Him. A fifth part of *La doctrine spirituelle* is given for the consideration of the seven gifts. His teaching on these matters is both fresh and deep, with interesting analogies to the teaching of Newman.

"The two elements of the spiritual life are the purgation of the heart and the direction of the Holy Spirit. These are the two poles of all spirituality. By these two ways one arrives at perfection, according to the degree of purity one acquires, and in proportion to the fidelity with which one co-operates with the movements of the Holy Spirit, and follows His guidance. All our perfection depends on this fidelity, and we can say that the spiritual life consists in remarking the ways and movements

of the Holy Spirit in our soul, and in justifying our will in the resolution of following them, using for this result all the exercises of prayer, reading, the sacraments, and the practice of the virtues and good works" (p. 181).

Books cannot teach the science of the interior life: "It is from on high that there comes the unction and the light which teaches it" (p. 233). "The end toward which we ought to aspire is to be so possessed and governed by the Holy Spirit, that it may be only He who rules all our powers and all our senses, and who governs all our movements, both interior and exterior" (p. 182).

We are told by Lallemant himself that he had a great devotion to the Holy Scriptures. He read them without ceasing, and made them almost his only study. "It is a great abuse," he says, "to read so many spiritual books and so little Holy Scripture" (*La doctrine spirituelle*, pp. 36, 220). "We ought to have a very special esteem and affection for the words of our Lord, which are recorded in the Gospel" (p. 368).

Souls are changed and perfected in the Holy Communion. "The more Jesus is within the soul, the more He will appear without" (p. 366). "The principal exercises of perfection are the sacraments" (p. 67). "Our life ought to be only a continual preparation to say mass and to receive communion. We should be always in the right disposition to approach the holy altar" (p. 384). We wish to have facility in talking in familiar fashion to our Lord after Communion, all imperfect as we are, and we vex ourselves because we feel no devotion. What we ought to do is to abandon ourselves into our Lord's hands, to allow Him to efface our sins and tear away their roots. When He has done that and our soul is pure, then He will speak to us, and we shall be able to be friends with Him" (p. 384).

This little book has been lately re-issued. It consists of 500 pages, excellently printed; it costs about eighteenpence. It should be in every religious house, and in the hands of every priest who can read French.

J. F. Briscoe

NOTICES

THE IDEALS OF ASCETICISM. By O. Hardman, D.D. S.P.C.K. 12s.

If Dr. Hardman's essay, *The Ideals of Asceticism*, represents the average standard of work done for the degree of Doctor of Divinity in the University of London, then the said standard is a very high one. The quantity of material handled is, judging from the list of works consulted, little less than vast, and the manner of handling it, if at times it is somewhat lacking in proportion, yet follows along the lines of the best traditions of the philosophy of comparative religion.

At the outset the writer is called upon to select what he terms a method of treatment, but what we clearly feel to be rather an attitude of mind, a spirit of criticism. Is he to deal with his subject, keeping himself so far as is possible in a state of emotional detachment, or is he to come to it with convictions as to certain dogmatic principles, certain spiritual *facta*, certain determinations of the moral law ? He is resolved that, for the Christian student, the latter is the only attitude; he is, admittedly, concerned with the supreme and ultimate Reality, with the Self-Existent; upon such he can lay no cold hand, to such he can turn with no faltering step, of such he can speak in no doubtful accents; true, he is a seeker, but he is a seeker equipped with sound wisdom, with trustworthy information, above all, with a passionate, yet discriminating, devotion to the object of his search. That Dr. Hardman advances in this spirit makes us value the more highly his all but exhaustive treatment of the ascetic ideal as it presented itself in the past, and as it still presents itself in the present, among the various non-Christian races who have been distinguished by it. A touch of enthusiasm is the inevitable accompaniment of all sympathetic criticism, and in a writer like Dr. Hardman it is profitable without any risk at all. The good Christian is the one person who can really—and safely—admire the good Muslim and the good Buddhist.

We should be disposed to find the kernel of the whole essay in the treatment of *The Mystical Ideal—Fellowship* (chapter iv.). It goes right down to the fundamental similitude between God and man, to the divine paternity and the human filiation, to the ultimate facts which—speaking in a Scotist sense—necessitated, *ab intra Deitatis*, the Incarnation itself. Man's part in aid of the consummation of this fellowship is essentially ascetic; the standard was fixed, and the possibility of its attainment was assured, by the sufferings of the Incarnate Son. There is a fellowship *in* the suffering; and *through* the suffering is the entrance to a fellowship in the glory; and, here and now, the fellowship in the suffering has, *raro et raptim*, its flashes of the vision of God, its faint nearness of His voice. " The crucifixion itself was not obviously a form of service to the human family " (p. 91). It is well to free ourselves from the utilitarian fallacy. Asceticism may promote righteousness, as it may effect reparation; we firmly believe that it does both; but surely it is true to say that even these two great ends are of the things which are added unto those who seek the Kingdom; and the Kingdom is no less than fellowship with the Divine. Therefore we recognize in this particular motive, as dealt with by Dr. Hardman, the central feature of the subject. And we are struck by the synthetic method which marks the whole treatment. If we discard the peculiar features of the different types of asceticism discussed, and search for what is common to them all, we find that, at whatever age of

the world's history, and at whatever spot on the face of the globe they are revealed, and whether fellowship, righteousness, or reparation be their aim, they belong, as it were, to one family, they are informed by a single impulse, they are motived by a common aim. We are conscious, as we study the history of each type, of the craving of the finite and the relative to realize itself in the infinite and the absolute; the latter may be thought of, for example, as the Bridegroom-Word, or merely as the cosmic essence of all life, it matters not; the ascetic thrust, often along lines of the very utmost resistance, is always in the direction of the incomprehensible; the familiar terms of the *Fides Athanasii* would not—actually do not—possess for the ascetic a cold academic connotation; they throb with the action and reaction of an impulse which is at once passionate and moral. St. Teresa's vision of the Godhead was as of a globe of light encompassing the universe, reflecting to her the most minute details of her state; the imagery is impersonal, suggestive rather of scientific optics than of the tender dealings of the lover of souls; and yet her effort is to be engulfed in this Godhead; all her ascetic discipline is directed to this end. "The life of my God is a life of incessant trouble. The cross is always on my shoulder; at the same time I surely make some progress. God is the Soul of my soul. He engulfs into Himself my soul." Dr. Hardman has done good service by emphasizing the transcendental aspect of asceticism, but he has not failed to indicate its utilitarian value in a sense far higher than the ordinary. The contemplative is really a national asset of so great importance just because he cannot be estimated in the same terms as the medical officer of health. He belongs to the circumambient *æther;* perhaps it would be inconvenient to the *ær*, and to the terrestrial globe, were the *æther* to be annihilated! Christian asceticism cannot fail to tell upon the social order; and our author strikes a very solemn note of warning when he indicates the failure of the Church—it is not quite clear whether he refers to the *Ecclesia Anglicana* exclusively or specially—to bring to the solution of the various problems of sex, class, industry, and the like, anything, on an appreciable scale, approximate to the movements which we associate with the names of St. Anthony, St. Benedict, and St. Francis. An enormous bureaucracy is encompassing us with an ever-widening orbit; as the result, not much else can be detected than printed reports. Historically the Church began with the monastic order and its *Opus Dei;* and then followed the religious orders with their service to humanity. We British folk profess to be sanely utilitarian; we have, in a measure, when restoring the full liberty of Catholic life, inverted the historical sequence, supposing, doubtless, that it was the more practical line to take. Probably, if not certainly, we have been wrong. We should have done wiser to have begun our evangelization of England by cultivating the asceticism of the mystic. We should have conformed then, not only to the Christian, but, speaking generally, to the universal method of realizing such communion with the Deity as is possible for fallen humanity.

WATKIN WILLIAMS.

THE CATHEDRAL CHURCH OF HEREFORD. Its History and Constitution. By Arthur Thomas Bannister, M.A. S.P.C.K. 7s. 6d.

The cathedral of Hereford will long remember its obligations to the untiring industry of its present Precentor, and all who love to trace the course of ecclesiastical administration in this country are equally indebted

to the Cantilupe Society for the splendidly complete production of a long series of the episcopal registers. I speak of such an achievement with real envy, because the Worcestershire Historical Society, for lack of larger support, has had to content itself with précis, whereas in Hereford they give you the document as it stands. Even the great labours of Canon Wilson on our Convent's *Liber Albus* must needs be reproduced in snippets. And the mention of that *Liber Albus* tempts me to inquire whether any reader of this journal can throw light on the disappearance of another, which is frequently referred to by William Thomas in his *Survey* as *Lib. Alb. Episc. Wig.* It seems only fair that the Bishop should have one as well as the chapter. I mention it here, partly because it has been suggested to me that this lost chartulary may be in the Vatican, where, I doubt not, THEOLOGY is appreciatively studied, and partly because no one would delight more at its recovery than Canon Bannister unless, perhaps, it were his master in the same lore, the late Canon Capes, to whom he dedicates the book.

The story that he has to unfold is not an exciting one, but it is told with rare skill and with a steady but not obtrusive reference to authorities all the time, and not the least valuable portion of it lies in the three-and-twenty appendices, which do much to relate Hereford to the customs and constitutions of other cathedrals.

It has often been pointed out—the latest insistence on it is in an admirable monograph in that otherwise statistical compendium, the report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Property and Revenues of the Church—that each of our ancient cathedrals "has a distinctive character of its own which has gradually been formed during the long centuries of its history." You may divide them—as, indeed, you must—into the New Foundations and the Old. You may say with Canon Bannister in his interesting note on the chapters of York, Lincoln, and Sarum that "by the middle of the thirteenth century all the secular foundations in England are found conforming more or less to the same type" as these three. Even when the Henrician statutes came down as a norm on the cathedrals of the New Foundation in or about 1544, they still left all manner of loopholes for the play of local idiosyncrasies.

Hereford, therefore, had a character of its own. Its early history is obscure; the growth of the town itself is not easy to trace. But some play of local forces decided that while Oswald was doggedly Benedictinizing his "familia" of five- or six-and-twenty missionary clergy at Worcester, the "tota congregatio Herefordensis ecclesiæ" remained secular. Its canons are mentioned in Domesday; but our author credits Walter, the Lotharingian Bishop, a royal chaplain like Giso of Wells, with the introduction at Hereford of the rule of St. Chrodegang. Anyhow, Hereford had its Dean and Canons, while its neighbour of Worcester had its Prior and convent, or, as the latter often styled themselves, "prior et capitulum." But though the Prior might add that he was "of the cathedral church of Worcester," and his brethren might call themselves "the chapter of the same place," yet they were none of them in law and very few in fact the result of the Bishop's choice. He was, indeed, responsible for ascertaining their fitness to be professed; he could veto the admission of any of them; his undisputed powers of visitation could interfere in the smallest details of their conventual life; but in the first instance the selection of the entrants did not rest with him, nor could the Pope himself "provide." Nevertheless, as their place-names show, they

were, more often than not, indigenous, with native links to the diocese stronger than any that the Bishop himself could normally claim, unless he happened to be a local magnate like Godfrey Giffard.

Contrast this with the course of things at Hereford, and read Canon Bannister's note on the Burgundian invasion of the chapter. The cathedral had hardly escaped out of the snare of Peter de Aquablanca's determination to thrust into all possible offices the cadets of his Savoyard clan, when there arose the hateful system of papal provisions, and, as the Canon points out, fourteen of the Hereford canonries were so filled between 1310 and 1330. When to this exotic condition are added the frequent absences of combative or diplomatist diocesans such as Thomas de Cantilupe and Adam de Orlton—an oddly assorted but not untypical pair —it will be understood that it cannot have been very easy to commend to the English folk on the banks of the Wye that sense of unitedness in the bond of Christian charity which alone could make them all one, when the trend of most secular things was to keep them apart. Nor could the feeling of dissidence have been mitigated, if the people realized that Bishop after Bishop was resisted in his attempt to include the Dean and chapter in his visitation. Their exemption was plainly real and actual, and it was characteristic of Laud's tendency to "bluff" his opponents, that in 1634 he should have told the Dean that his Majesty "finds cause enough to suspect the partialitie of your Register in many particulars conserning your exempcon." That may be as it may; the chapter's freedom and the Dean's supremacy may have been sound or rotten. But in such circumstances it is wonderful that the cathedral of Hereford has, nevertheless, been brought into the main current of diocesan life, while still retaining, as this book shows, the cultivated and enthusiastic love of its "maiores personæ."

ERNEST WORCESTER.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: ITS NATURE AND CONDITIONS. By L. T. Hobhouse, D.Lit., Ll.D. Martin White Professor of Sociology in the University of London. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 12/6 net.

Any attempt to write a short summary of this important book must inevitably do it an injustice. It is a book that should be read and pondered on chapter by chapter. Yet the main purpose of the author stands out clearly. History, as Professor Hobhouse views it, "suggests a broad connection between the growth of knowledge and its application on the one hand, and the extent and character of social organization on the other" (p. 13). This suggested correlation is the starting-point of the enquiry. The author finds the "conditions governing the life of communities" in the "duality of human relation, mutual need crossed by mutual pressure and constraint." He holds that the "social principle of mutual need carried to completion would yield a harmonious development of humanity as a whole which corresponds to the ethical ideal," and believes that though "the actual movements of societies reveal partial developments which are not always in harmony with each other or with ethical requirements, as well as periods of mere stagnation, arrest, and decay," we have no right to conclude to "some inherent inconsistency or maladjustment in things human which for progress involves self-defeat" (p. 327). If, then, we ask whether we can form an "intelligible coherent conception of a Good common to humanity"; whether there can arise a true, "effective, co-operative will directed to this Good";

whether such a will can "control the conditions of life sufficiently to secure its end": the book seeks "to suggest an affirmative answer" to all these questions (p. 338). Partial aims conflict with one another, but the "fundamental rationality of mind consistently points beyond them to something comprehending and superseding them as they have comprehended and superseded narrower views." "Hence for us," Professor Hobhouse concludes, "the further step which is required to that governing principle which alone can make progress secure is merely the continuance of a movement proceeding from the nature of mind." "We here reach," he says (p. 339), "the common root of the two moods—the indicative and the imperative. The nature of the will is to respond to such conceptions of the good as it can form, and in propounding to it an ideal as really good, we are at once stimulating the will and maintaining that because our ideal is valid, it will be found in the long run to appeal to it." This conception, though it makes for hope, is not to be confused with the belief in "automatic progress" (p. 14, *cf.* p. 340). The argument seems to show that the "supposed contradiction and impossibilities in the realization of the ideal are imaginary"; and the conclusion is ultimately reached that "social development is a phase in the cosmic process of the development of Mind under conditions which it can never abolish, but can, and gradually does, subdue to its own ends" (p. 15).

Even this brief account of its purport is enough to suggest that we have here a book of great value for the generation to whom it is addressed; and this impression will be strengthened when we observe how Professor Hobhouse deals with some of the contemporary tendencies with which, on the one hand or the other, a sane and moderate view like his comes into conflict. By calling his view "sane and moderate" we need not be taken to deny either its boldness or its originality.

Perhaps the most interesting part of the book is the criticism in chapter xiv. of the various arguments brought forward in support of the thesis that comprehensive progress, particularly on humanitarian lines, is impossible, since progress in one direction involves defeat and retrogression in others. The Malthusian doctrine that "improved conditions of life defeat themselves by causing an increase of numbers" has given place "to the reverse objection that with the advance of civilization we are threatened with a diminished birth-rate, especially amongst the most cultivated classes" (p. 328). The writers who maintain that the higher classes are becoming sterile "because they have to pay rates and taxes for the benefit of the outcast" cannot—so Professor Hobhouse argues—have made so close a study of public finance as of biology (p. 117). "The great burden of taxation," he says, "is due not to the maintenance of the needy, but to military expenditure"—*i.e.*, to the "failure of the wise and eminent" to control national passions. It is important, on the one hand, to "sift the elements of truth in the eugenic jeremiads"—for as Professor Hobhouse recognizes, they have in them elements of truth—"from the dross of dislike and fear of popular causes" (p. 238); and his chapter on "The Conditions of Social Development" will furnish much help to the reader who really wishes to carry out this sifting process in his own mind. The book has, on the other hand, lessons of equal importance for those humanitarian thinkers who are naturally stirred to sympathy with all popular causes, and especially for those unduly hopeful persons who are ready to attribute all our troubles to some single influence which can be easily named or nicknamed; "Private Enterprise," "Capi-

talism," or whatever it may be. There is a vast number of honest and earnest men in the wage-earning classes who are enthusiastically and unselfishly set upon the improvement of social conditions, whose feelings are deeply stirred by social injustice. Professor Hobhouse's perception that the causes which impede progress are not simple but complex, joined with his belief that "the wills of men are the true causes of social change," and that "the development of society in its completeness is conditioned by the available fund of moral wisdom" (p. 14), is exactly the teaching which thoughtful men of this type need, and which has a real chance of convincing those to whom "eugenic jeremiads," even if they find them interesting, are addressed in vain. If we could convince the manual workers of this country that the social problem, though not intrinsically incapable of successful solution, is, none the less, extremely complex; that the increase in the efficiency of a social system may often impede what Professor Hobhouse calls "the complete fulfilment of the individual personality" (p. 87); that the "best environment" is not that which selects some special quality for survival, but "that which makes room for the greatest wealth of diversity" (p. 118); we should have done a good work. The present time is rather a favourable time for those who would teach these and similar lessons. The manual worker is touched and pleased at the kindly and respectful way in which, on the whole, the higher classes and the newspapers have received the Labour Government. He is therefore unusually willing just now to listen to reasonable criticism; and arguments like those of this book, especially when brought to his notice by men who have no personal axe to grind, are the kind of arguments to which he will give attention.

To readers whose interests lie chiefly in theology the book may be recommended for its treatment of what Mr. Bosanquet has called "the popular doctrine of Free Will" (pp. 317 ff). The author of a recent novel, speaking of the period after the war, describes how "forces were at work, biological, evolutionary and mysterious forces which no man could understand and govern." Professor Hobhouse, perfectly familiar with the type of thought which dictates such phrases, affirms, on the contrary, that "all significant social changes, far from development in independence of the will, are developments *of* the will, or consequences thereof"; and holds that within certain limits which he indicates—*e.g.*, those of physical possibilities—"there is nothing that will cannot by sufficient effort accomplish" (p. 326). That a writer "who sees no cause of progress except in the human mind and will" (p. 338) and yet, on the whole, writes hopefully should be so little satisfied as Professor Hobhouse is with the doctrine that choice is a "cause of effects, but not itself an effect of anterior causes" (p. 318), and should speak of "the fancied indeterminateness of the will" (p. 323), is instructive. A study of the chapter in which these sayings occur might help to prevent the theologian from assuming—and the assumption is quite common—that every type of deterministic theory reduces man to the level of a machine, and represents humanity as the helpless spectator of its own fortunes. Professor Hobhouse is no "indeterminist"; yet he recognizes that men "moving in the mass on lines which no foresight of theirs has traced" are yet "not without eventual power of self-guidance and an emergent vision of the true Good."

C. J. Shebbeare.

THE LIFE OF ST. DOMINIC. By Bede Jarrett, O.P. Burns, Oates and Washbourne. 6s.

Father Jarrett, quite unintentionally, gives us an ideal rather than a historical account of one to whom the Roman Church owes much. The Provincial has failed so to detach himself as to give us an unbiased view of the founder of his order. "Reading as he strode along the roads, talking of divine things . . . to his newly rising convents . . . singing hymns and filling all Europe with his song . . . this is the picture of the saint in which, perhaps, the imagination best loves to dwell." Doubtless, but it is not history. Dante's description is as succinct as true: "Kindly to friends, fierce to foes." Justly does the Provincial protest against the equally fanciful picture of associating Dominic with thumbscrews and faggots; yet his "gentleness" upon which the author constantly dwells was of a negative kind, and he never once protested against the atrocities of the Crusaders or the cruelties of Papal and Conciliar decrees. His penances were severe, and he quoted with approval the Spanish proverb that a stick succeeded where a word failed. Dominic laid the foundation upon which was built up the Inquisition of horrible memory, although the Ordo Predicatorum, in their General Chapter of Paris in A.D. 1252, repudiated both titles of Dominicani and Inquisitores—a fact which the author does not mention. At Dominic's Process "garrulous" (*sic*) women acclaimed this "gentleness," but again Father Jarrett fails to mention that the very Bishop who conducted this Process celebrated it the same day by burning a sick old woman, bed and all, whom he trapped into a confession of heresy. The service which Dominic rendered was the reformation of the Church, not the suppression of heresy; hence Father Jarrett would have done greater justice to his hero if he had painted the scandals of the Church in their true colours, as do, *e.g.*, the Epistles of Innocent: "Blind! dumb dogs, simoniacs, who absolve the rich and condemn the poor." The Archbishop of Narbonne "knows no other god but money. His heart is a blank. He has not visited his Province, not even his Diocese, for ten years." Amid some needless repetition the chief merit of the book lies in its detailed account of the organization of the Order, and its laudable object, the acquisition of learning. In this connection the author indulges in some "modernist" opinions which, however, have not alarmed those who have given the book their "Nihil obstat" and "Imprimatur." By the way, we have not found "that passage in the Acts of the Apostles that recounts the coming of the Holy Spirit on the family of Cornelius in the house of Simon the Tanner."

H. J. WARNER.

THE PHARISEES

THE PHARISEES. By R. T. Herford. Allen and Unwin. 10s. 6d.

STUDIES IN PHARISAISM AND THE GOSPELS. By I. Abrahams. (2nd series.) Cambridge University Press. 10s.

Mr. Herford's earlier book on the Pharisees is well known. His new book supersedes it, for in the interval he has worked over the ground again and formed fresh conclusions. Let it be said at once that the volume before us is very well written, indispensable to the serious student of the New Testament, and, if its conclusions stand, damaging to the claims of historical Christianity.

Mr. Herford starts from Ezra, in whom two main ideas are seen: the setting-up of a barrier between Jew and Gentile, and the revelation of the divine will in the Torah (Torah is used throughout the book without being translated. Its real meaning is "teaching." The Torah of Moses means the teaching given through Moses and contained in the Pentateuch. But Torah has a continuous existence, and as time goes on the unwritten Torah gains at the expense of the written. The LXX wrongly translated the word by *νόμος* and St. Paul, "who ought to have known better" (p. 54), perpetuated the error.) The second of these ideas necessitated the existence of interpreters. These were called Sopherim (scribes)—that is, "men of the book." The original scribes, or the Great Synagogue, died out about 270 B.C., after which follow 100 years blank. About 196 the Sanhedrin was formed, the name of which proves Greek influence. Among those who contended for Judaism in the Maccabæan Wars we must distinguish a moderate party and an extreme party, the Hasidim, whose interest was religious, and who resented the mingling of politics and religion under the Hasmonæan dynasty. The difference between the two sections, which afterwards developed into the Sadducees and Pharisees, lay "in their respective attitude to the Oral Tradition in its application to the Torah"; all other differences are of secondary importance. The political leaders took their stand on the text of the written Torah as against "an interpretation of the Torah, whereby its authority could be extended indefinitely" (p. 29). The actual split took place in the reign of John Hyrcanus (135-105 B.C.). An association of "haberim" (companions) was formed, men pledged to observe the laws of tithe and of clean and unclean. They were in four grades, all alike marked off from "the people of the land." The first and largest order, through which all had to pass, was called Pherushim. This was the origin of the name. The Pharisees were about 6,000 in number according to Josephus, but their influence penetrated far beyond their own ranks. If they represented the old Hasidim, the Sadducees were not the Hellenists, for they were as eager for levitical purity as the Pharisees, differing from them only as regards the unwritten Torah. The Pharisees were not a party in the ordinary sense, but were non-political. Their whole concern was religious, whereas the Sadducees were a party, not indifferent to religion, but primarily political. "It was the trial of strength between the purely religious and the political theory of Jewish national life" (p. 45). As to the other parties, the Herodians were probably not Jews at all for the most part. The Essenes and the Zealots were two wings of the Pharisees, produced by the oppressions of Herod. The Essenes solved the problem of living under the Torah by withdrawal from the world; the Zealots agreed with the Pharisees in their devotion to the Torah, but were no longer satisfied with peaceful methods. The result of the great split sometime before 105 B.C. was that there was no more unity in Judaism, not even in the years leading to 70 A.D. "When the storm died away, the Pharisees alone survived" (p. 52).

The essence of Pharisaism, therefore, is its insistence on a living revelation. Psalm 119 is a great hymn of praise to Torah—not the Pentateuch, but the living guide based on the written books which declared God's will. This psalm breathes the spirit of Pharisaism. The teaching of the Rabbis was either Halachah or Haggadah. "A halachah . . . was a specific declaration of the divine will applicable to a given case." It was defined by the supreme religious legislative authority;

it was based on careful study, and defined by a majority. Once promulgated it was irreversible save by a majority vote of a Council which exceeded the former in wisdom and number. The Greeks, noticing only that side of Halachah which bore fruit in regulations for Community life, translated it by νόμος ("law"), an error which to this day obscures the true meaning of Pharisaism. Haggadah is the interpretation of Scripture with a view to edification. Broadly speaking, Halacha and Haggadah correspond to Christian moral and doctrinal theology. But the emphasis is completely different. In Pharisaism Haggadah is free, Halacha enforced; in Christianity great freedom of conduct is allowed, but Creeds are enforced. The bond of union afforded by Halacha in Judaism, Christianity finds in dogma, worked out in far more detail than anything in Rabbinism.

Christian opinion has never treated the Pharisees fairly. It has contrasted them unfavourably with the prophets, not noticing that Ezra and his successors did what the prophets failed to do—namely, enforce moral and religious teaching on the lives of the people. The Synagogue is praised by Christian writers, and is indeed recognized as having been the model for the primitive Christian communities, but it was the centre of Pharisaic influence. The later Christian critics have been *ex hypothesi* non-Jews, the earliest were Jews who broke with Pharisaism and Halachah in favour of freedom, and are therefore not trustworthy witnesses. Current statements are mostly misstatements. The Rabbis have always been keenly alive to the danger of hypocrisy. The external authority of the Torah is to the Jew the authority of God; no opposition has ever been felt between conscience and Halachah. The doctrine of merit is quite consistent with humility. "Enter thou into the joy of thy Lord" is exactly what the Pharisee meant by his doctrine of reward. The Rabbis insisted more on the nearness of God than on His transcendence. If they taught that all men were children of God, but sonship was effectually realized only in Israel, the Church has taught a precisely similar doctrine.

Mr. Herford's treatment of our Lord and St. Paul makes painful reading. The Pharisees did not understand Jesus; no one like Him had ever appeared before, and they were taken by surprise. Nor did He understand them, such were His limitations. "That he had any far-reaching views upon any subject of thought whatever . . . does not, so far as I can see, anywhere appear" (p. 203). As regards Halachah, "he would be an outsider, with no means of forming a correct judgment upon what he saw, at the mercy of rumour" (p. 207). He made no attempt to understand the Pharisees, nor did they try to understand Him. Matt. xxiii. (generally taken to be a sharpening of our Lord's teaching in view of current controversies in the Palestinian Church) may well be the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus, "because it is quite intelligible that a man, driven to bay by his opponents, should turn and rend them" (p. 209).

As to St. Paul, "all that Paul said about the burden of the Law, and of man being sold under bondage under sin, was presumably true of himself; but it did not correspond to anything in the experience of the Pharisees" (p. 165). Paul's attack on Judaism is misrepresentation. Had Judaism been what he describes, it would have been extinct long ago. Mr. Herford styles the apostle's treatment of the Jews "a shameful story" (p. 224). Judaism since 70 A.D. is essentially Pharisaism. It and Christianity are two great religions. When Christianity has finished its task, then Judaism will step forward and offer the world its imperishable treasure, preserved through the ages.

Mr. Herford is a Unitarian, and by his conclusion apparently means that the world will one day weary of the dogmatic fables of Christianity, and adopt the pure monotheism preserved by the Jews. Such a conclusion is repellent to Christian readers, but they may well feel that Mr. Herford's arguments need answering. Where, then, is the fallacy? The sources on which he relies are almost entirely later than 70 A.D. Now the Church-Judaism, as it may be called, dominated by a purified Pharisaism, which prevailed after the fall of Jerusalem, was clearly a very different thing from the Jewish State prior to 70, with its many parties and fanatical hatreds. The general impression gained by reading Josephus corroborates the Gospel picture of Judaism rather than Mr. Herford's. But Mr. Herford's method is to rule out the New Testament writers as partisan witnesses. Much later writers are relied on as evidence of what Judaism was like before the cataclysm. If the Judaism which confronted our Lord and His apostles was that described in Mr. Herford's book, then the New Testament writers cannot be acquitted of serious misrepresentation of the facts. But no historian can possibly accept his methods of weighing evidence. That no renegade Jew's word can be accepted, is apparently his canon. Just think how far this takes us. Luther's evidence regarding German Catholicism in the early sixteenth century must be ruled out on this principle. The picture of Philip Gosse and a Victorian Puritan household drawn in *Father and Son* is valueless because the son came out of bondage. J. H. Newman's description of Anglicanism in the *Apologia* is not evidence; and so on. We regard *The Pharisees* as a most important book, for it contains a slashing attack on historic Christianity by a Unitarian writer, and it is well to know the worst. It corrects many current misconceptions, and for this reason must be welcomed. But we believe the argument to be completely vitiated by the manner in which the evidence is treated.

It is a relief to turn to Dr. Abrahams' beautiful book, a second series of *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*. What we missed in the Unitarian writer we find in full measure in the Jew. Dr. Abrahams' book is a sheer delight. Every page reveals learning, delicacy of touch, suspense of judgment where suspense is necessary, and spiritual perception. We have left no space to discuss his book in detail, but the chapter on the Yoke, in which Chrysostom's exegesis is commended in preference to that of modern scholars, may be mentioned as specially interesting. Two quotations will show the direction in which Mr. Herford's book may be answered. On p. 10 we read, "All this would strengthen the view that the Gospel attack is directed (here and elsewhere) not on Pharisaism, but against certain Pharisees"—a solution so obvious that one might shrink from adopting it without the approval of Dr. Abrahams. And on p. 12 certain contingencies are discussed. "If that be so, then we can perceive how ill-conceived is the method of the Schürer School, who convert the Gospel attack on the School of Shammai into a condemnation of Pharisaism, which, as a system, emerges historically with the school of Hillel triumphant." This sentence alone seems to destroy much of Mr. Herford's case. I have noticed a casual allusion to Shammai in his book, but the name does not occur in the index. Clearly, then, there are many possibilities not discussed.

W. K. L. CLARKE.

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